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Abstract
In radiation environment (e.g., space, nuclear reactor), electronics can fail due to
bitflips in the flipflops of integrated circuits. A common solution is to triplicate
the flipflops and connect their outputs to a voter. If one of the three bits is flipped,
then the voter outputs the majority value and tolerates the error. This method is
called triple modular redundancy (TMR).
TMR can cause about 300% area redundancy. An alternative way is error de-
tection with on-demand recomputation, where the recomputation is done by re-
peating the failed processing request to the processing circuit. The computation
is done in consecutive transactions, which we call transaction-based processing.
We implemented and evaluated the aforementioned alternative approach us-
ingparity checkingon theMicrosemiProASIC3FPGA,which is oftenused in space
applications. The results show that parity-based error detection with our system
recovery approach can save up to 54%of the area overhead that would be caused
by the TMR, and achieve in most circuits slightly beƦer timing results than TMR
onProASIC3. This area saving can be the key for fiƦing the application to a space-
constrained chip.
Zusammenfassung
In einer Strahlungsumgebung wie im All oder in der Nähe eines Atomreaktors
können elektronische Geräte durch Bitkipper in den Flipflops integrierter Schal-
tungen ausfallen. Eine gängige Methode gegen die Bitkipper ist triple modular
redundancy (TMR), bei der jedes Flipflop der Schaltung dreifach instanziiert wird
und die Ausgänge der Flipflops zu einem Voter angeschlossen werden. Falls eins
von den drei Bits gekippt wird, dann gibt der Voter den Majoritätswert aus und
toleriert somit diesen Fehler.
TMR kann etwa 300% Flächenaufwand verursachen. Eine alternativeMetho-
de istFehlerdetektionmitanschließenderNeuverarbeitungder letztenDaten.Die
Neuverarbeitung der Datenwird durch dieWiederholung der letztenDatenverar-
beitungsanfragezurSchaltungrealisiert.DieVerarbeitungderDatenerfolgtdurch
nacheinanderfolgende Transaktionen und diese Art von Datenverarbeitung nen-
nen wir transaktions-basierte Datenverarbeitung in dieser Arbeit.
WirhabendieobenerwähnteMethode implementiertundbewertet,wobeiwir
als Fehlerdetektionsmethode Paritätsprüfung eingesetzt haben. Die Bewertung
erfolgte auf dem FPGA Microsemi ProASIC3, das bei Avionikanwendungen sehr
verbreitet ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass unsere Methode bis zu 54% des Flä-
chenaufwandseinsparenkann, der sonst vomTMRverursachtwäre.Andererseits
kannunsereMethode indenmeistenSchaltungenetwasbesseresTimingals TMR
erzielen. Die Flächeneinsparung könnte maßgeblich für die Implementierung ei-
ner Anwendung auf einer begrenzen Chipfläche sein.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electronics for airborne and space systems, called avionics, must often be pro-
tected from ionizing radiation inandcoming fromspace. In theabsenceofa shield
like themagnetic field of the earth, high energy particles can traverse through the
digital circuit fabric and cause bitflips in the flipflops of a circuit.
Also terrestrial computing systems at sea level are exposed to some amount
of radiation, but the probability that a bit in a flipflop is flipped is relatively low
compared to higher aƦitudes in atmosphere or space. Still, as more bits can be
stored on the same chip area, the computing systems at sea level also show signs
of bitflips.
Wheresomeof the inducedbitflipscanvanishunnoticedby thecomputingsys-
tem, somebitflips can lead toa restart or freezeof a system. This is not an issue if a
personal computer restarts, but this should not happen with a critical system like
a server which tracks financial transactions or a computer, which guides a space
vehicle. Such systemsmustbedependable andbeable to toleratepossible threats
in theirworking environment, e.g., component failure due to agingor high energy
particles present in space striking through system components.
Dependablecomputersoftenusemodular redundancyagainst component fail-
ures. Modular redundancymeans that amodule is presentmany times that failure
of amodule can be tolerated by switching to the redundantmodules. If the effect
of a threat is permanent, i.e., a component cannot be used after a failure, then a
systemwith n equal components can tolerate up to n− 1 component failures.
In contrast, if a threat is only temporary, e.g., by recoveringa failed component
by a restart, there is no need to include many redundant modules. A well-known
fault tolerance approach against temporary module failures is the triple modular
redundancy (TMR), which provides a straightforward error detection and recov-
ery approach by triplicating a module and connecting the modules to a voter en-
tity, and the voter entity selects the trusted output. For instance, amajority voter
outputs yes if two of the modules output yes and one no by trusting the major-
ity. Consequently, TMR can tolerate a failure of a single module and enables the
continuation of the service. Still, while one module is in failure, module recovery
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must be initiated to avoid a failure of the system (consisting of these three mod-
ules), because a secondmodule failure will cause a system failure.
The idea of TMR can also be applied on components of avionics. Digital se-
quential circuits which are part of avionics also often implement TMR. If TMR is
implemented solely on the flipflops, it is called local TMR (LTMR). In LTMR, for
every application flipflop in the circuit two redundant flipflops are created, which
store the same bit as the application flipflop. The outputs of these three flipflops
are then connected to amajority voter.
The LTMR approach has the advantage of built-in error detection and recov-
ery: If a flipflop bit is flipped during a clock cycle, then this bit error is masked by
the voter. In the next cycle, the flipped flipflopwill be overwriƦenwith the correct
bit coming from the combinatorics, leading to the recovery from the erroneous
state of the flipflop.
LTMR can be easily applied on a circuit and is often applied using commercial
available software tools. Unfortunately, LTMR comes at a significant cost of ad-
ditional space for redundant flipflops. Additionally, redundant flipflops can also
account for excess power consumption.
Onspace- andpower-constrainedapplications, analternative is to apply aner-
ror detection approach instead of LTMR, because error detection generally incurs
less resources than error correction.
A circuit which implements error detection can only flag an error, but cannot
correct erroneous data, or recover itself fromanerroneous state. In this situation,
this circuit can be recovered externally from the failure state by another system
component and the last processing request to this circuit can be retried. In this
work, we propose this approach, and call it error detection–based fault tolerance
andwill be abbreviated as EDFT.
In chronological order, EDFT involves the following actions:
• the detection of the error
• system recovery on the circuit using isolation and error handling
• error detection and systemrecovery on theuser application retrying the last
processing request to the circuit
The last action can be carried out by a request and response–based processing
protocol between two systems. In this work, this processing technique is called
transaction-based processing.
The three actions of EDFT can be implemented by different approaches. To
evaluate EDFT in detail and compare to the state of the art, not only generic spec-
ifications but also concrete implementation of EDFT’s components are needed.
In the next section, wewill present a data processing architecture, onwhich EDFT
can be applied. With the help of this example architecture, we will describe the
EDFT’s componentsmore in detail and then evaluate EDFT by using the concrete
implementations.
1.1. APPLICATIONONAPROCESSING ARCHITECTURE 3
data handling subsystem
fault-tolerant
processor FPGA subsystem
link links
Figure 1.1: Overview of the reference processing architecture. Processor commu-
nicates with other subsystems through the FPGA.
1.1 Application on a processing architecture
In this section, we describe a reference model of an on-board data handling unit
(OBDH) for satellites [Tre+14]. Using this example architecture we will briefly ex-
plain in the following section how EDFT is implemented. The detailed implemen-
tationwill be discussed in the following chapters. Moreover, this particular imple-
mentationwill also be used for comparingEDFTwith state of the art in the follow-
ing chapters.
First,wedescribe anoverviewof the system, then the target circuit, andfinally
the communication protocol between the processor and the circuit.
1.1.1 Overview
Figure 1.1 showsanoverviewof thearchitecture. TheOBDHsubsystemcomprises
of two main processing modules: a processor and an FPGA. The processor runs
the mission software, which involves communicating with different subsystems
on-board of the space system. The communication is done through the FPGA,
which acts as an interface component and implements the various communica-
tion interfaces needed by the subsystems (e.g., UART, CAN). We assume that the
processor, the communication line between the processor and the FPGA, and the
subsystems are sufficiently protected against soft errors.
1.1.2 FPGADesign
From the processor point of view, the FPGA is a remote memory bus, where the
implemented link interfaces are memory-mapped. The processor utilizes these
interfacemodules by reading and writing the respectivememory areas.
The simplified FPGAmodel consists of three functional blocks: sequential cir-
cuits A, B, and C as shown in figure 1.2. Circuit A serves the memory access re-
quests from the processor to circuit B, which issuesmemory accesses on circuit C
andfinally returns thedata to theprocessorusing theFIFO interfaceof circuitA. In
figure 1.3, circuit B is described as a finite statemachine (FSM). Circuit B reads the
memory access request packets sent by the processor from the FIFO and trans-
forms them inmemory accesses for circuit C. Circuit Cwith amemory block inside
resembles the memory-mapped interfaces. The memories transfer one word per
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Figure 1.2: Excerpt from the FPGA design. Circuit Bmust be hardened by design.
Other circuits are immune to soft errors.
resetstart parseheader
write
RAM
read
RAM
send
response
Figure 1.3: Simplified state diagramof circuit B,which parses the remotememory
packets sent by themission software (i.e., the processor)
cycle. Circuit A and C including the FIFOs and RAMare assumed to be sufficiently
protected against soft errors (e.g., by LTMR and error correcting and detecting
code). Circuit Bmust be hardened by design.
The FIFOs and the memory need a single clock cycle for reading or writing a
single word, thus the data flow to the memories can be controlled with a single
word granularity.
1.1.3 Communication Protocol
The communication protocol between the processor and the FPGA is visualized in
figure 1.4. The protocol consists of two kinds ofmessages: request and response,
which bothmake up a single transaction.
The processor sendsmemory access requests for a specific address or address
interval to the FPGAand the FPGA (more precisely, circuit B) answerswith the ac-
cording response: A read request is respondedwith read data and awrite request
is acknowledged after the write operation. Every request is acknowledged with a
response and a second request cannot be sent before the response to the first re-
quest has been received. If the FPGA does not respond after a timeout, e.g., due
to a soft error, the last request is repeated.
The communication protocol can send one word per cycle and the messages
canbe composedofmultiplewords. The validity of a singlemessage is dependent
on the last word sent. If the last word flags an error or is not present after a time-
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SW FPGA
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Figure 1.4: Sequence diagram of the communication protocol, which is based on
transactions. A transaction consists of a request (req) and a response (resp). The
left diagram shows a normal sequence: every request is followed by a response.
On the right, the behavior in case of an error in the FPGA is visualized: if still no
response after a timeout is received, the last transaction is repeated.
Figure 1.5: Design from figure 1.2 with error detection–based fault tolerance
(EDFT) applied on circuit B
out, then all the words until the last valid packet are discarded. Consequently,
in case of an error, already transmiƦed words of a packet are discarded and the
transaction fails.
1.1.4 Hardening
Now, we describe how EDFT can be applied on the reference architecture. Fig-
ure 1.5 shows EDFT hardware components aƦached to the target circuit. If a bit
in circuit B flips, then the error signal is activated by the error detection module.
The error signal activates the error handling module, which immediately masks
the target circuit’s outputs to isolate the circuit. While the circuit stays in isolated
state, the error handler recovers circuit from the erroneous state by activating the
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reset signal of circuit B.
As circuit B was reset, no valid response could be sent. Consequently, the last
request to circuit B is repeated according to the communication protocol and the
processing can continue.
Compared to the state-of-the-art approach TMR, EDFT has a lower area (thus
also power) overhead,which can be the key factor to fit an application on a space-
constrained chip. The critical path overhead is similar to TMR, so the hardened
application can runat similar clock frequencies. Compared toTMR,EDFT requires
a software component which retries a failed transaction, which should not have a
significant overhead.
From the theoretical perspective, the concepts used byEDFT are not novel ap-
proaches. Still, this work contributes to the existing work by:
• applying EDFT on a real processing architecture
• evaluating EDFT using a state-of-the-art FPGA for space applications
• evaluating EDFT analytically and experimentally using placed-and-routed
circuits
• describing theautomaticapplicationofEDFTusingaparity-basedapproach.
1.2 Next chapters and backgroundwork
After we have shown an overview of EDFT using an example, in next chapters
we will discuss it more in detail. First, some preliminaries important for under-
standing EDFTwill be handled in chapter 2. The chapter 3will address the related
work. Then, chapter4analyzes anexample implementationof theerror detection
module: parity-based error detection. A possible drawback of parity-based error
detection is the timing impact. In chapter 5, we propose a pipelining approach
which can alleviate this impact. The remaining components of EDFT - error han-
dling and transaction-based processing will be discussed in chapter 6. Finally, we
will conclude the work by giving some recommendations regarding testing of an
EDFT-applied system, summarizing importantpoints of theworkandgiving some
suggestions for the future work.
The following publications make up the background work for the following
chapters:
• [AF15b] introduces the idea of EDFT in general, which was already done in
section 1.1.
• in [AF15c] we give a first insight to the performance of EDFT using parity-
based error detection by comparing our approach with LTMR analytically.
Synthesis results using a real circuit is gathered in [AF15a]. These contribu-
tionsmake up part of chapter 4.
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• thework for pipelinedparity approach in chapter 5originates from [AF16b].
• [AF16a] isanextendedversionof [AF15a]andprovidesamoredetailedspec-
ification, and fault tolerance analysis of transaction-based processing. The
contributions in this work were used in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
We begin this chapter by introducing general goals and concepts in dependable
computing. In section 2.2 discuss about transient effects in digital circuits, in sec-
tion 2.3 about our fault model. In section 2.4, we give an overview of techniques
for achieving fault tolerance against bitflips in flipflops of a digital circuit. In sec-
tion 2.5, we give additional information about FPGAs for radiation environment,
as our evaluations in next chapters and the implementation of our work is based
on an FPGA. Section 2.6 is dedicated to the FPGA thatweused in our evaluations,
the ProASIC3. After the introduction of these concepts and background informa-
tion, in section 2.7, we present our proposed approachmore in detail.
2.1 Concepts of dependable computing
Some termsor common concepts used in thiswork regarding fault tolerance, e.g.,
fault, error, fault handling, error handling, can have different meanings in differ-
ent fields of science or evendifferent perceptions by different persons in the same
field. Because of this reason, we give the definitions of some terms and common
concepts of fault tolerance that are used in thiswork. Thedefinitions are basedon
the well-knownwork [Avi+04], which compiles the common terms and concepts
belonging to dependable and secure computing. The terms and concepts intro-
duced in [Avi+04] are very broad andwewill confineus to the terms and concepts
relevant to this work and give examples by applying these terms and concepts on
systems used in embedded computers and digital circuits.
In what follows, we first introduce the terms important for the concept of de-
pendability, fault tolerance and soft error. Then,wepresent themeans for achiev-
ing dependability and fault tolerance of a system.
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componentsystem
Figure 2.1: A system consists of components. A component itself is a system too.
2.1.1 Systems and threats to dependability
A system is an entity that interacts with other entities. A system can deliver ser-
vices to other systems in its environment via its use interfaces and can receive ser-
vices fromother systems. For instance, anonboarddatahandling system (OBDH)
on a space satellite stores and periodically transmits gathered data during a mis-
sion to earth, and also handles the communication between other systems on a
satellite. The OBDH delivers a data communication service to the systems on-
board the satellite and a housekeeping data transmission service to the satellite
operator on earth. Note that a satellite operator and thus a human can also be
abstracted as a system. A use interface of theOBDHcan be a softwaremodule for
decoding the data packets received from other systems, if we observe the OBDH
from the software point of view. On the other hand, from the hardware point of
viewOBDH, aplugmountedon the caseof thedatahandling systemwouldbe the
use interface. It is obvious that a system can be perceived differently in different
abstraction levels.
A system consists of one or more components, which contribute to the ser-
vice delivered by the system. A system is a recursive term, a component of a sys-
tem is also a system itself. For instance, the circuit board component carrying the
mainprocessor chipofanOBDHis itself a systemwhich interactswithother circuit
boards inside theOBDHenclosure. Themainprocessor chip is a systemwhich can
runsoftwareandprocessdataasaservice, consistingof thecircuitdieand thechip
pins. The circuit on the die consists of digital and analog circuitry, where the digi-
tal circuitry consists of combinational and sequential logic elements. A flipflop as
a sequential element canalsobeabstractedas a systemwhich can store aBoolean
value as a service.
A dependable system tries to deliver a correct service to its users, but there
are threats against the service delivery. A service failure is an event that causes
a transition to a system state, where the system cannot deliver its service to the
users on its use interface in an expected way and the failure leads to an incorrect
service. A failure is caused by one or more errors inside the system. An error is a
deviation fromthe correct systemstate,which can lead toa system failure, butnot
every deviation from the correct system state must end up in a failure. A system
service has an external state, which determines how the service is delivered at the
use interface. The rest of the system state is defined by the internal state. Only
a deviation from the correct external service state can be perceived by the user,
and thus is a failure. Consequently, an error in a systemmust propagate (through
components) and change the external system state to cause a failure. A fault is
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internal
state
external
state
system
total system state
user
Figure 2.2: Illustration of a system delivering services to a user. The total system
state controls how the services are delivered to the user. The total system state
consists of the internal andexternal state. Thepart of the total systemstatewhich
canbeobservedby the user is the external state, the remainingpart is the internal
state. The arrow shows the flow of information.
the cause of an error. A fault can be internal or external. A fault must be active
that it can cause an error. During the time period when a fault does not lead to
an error, the fault is dormant. Note that a failure in a system component does not
have to cause a system failure, but this failure can cause an error in a neighboring
systemcomponentwhich in turn can activate an error in the external service state
and cause a system failure. The concepts discussed until now are illustrated in
figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
Imagine a data processing circuit that receives amemory access request at its
use interface, accesses amemory circuit according to thememory access request
and transmits a response to the user. A correct service is delivered, if the circuit
accesses thememory correctly and responds according to the request. Awrite ac-
cess request to a (normally) not used address causes an assertion of both the read
andwrite enable signals of thememory, andnowriteoperation canbeexecuted in
return. Let this behavior due toabug in the synthesizablehardwaredescriptionof
the data processing circuit due to a wrong reasoning of a developer. In this case,
the wrong reasoning is an error of the developer, which have caused a dormant
fault in the circuit. Note that according to [Avi+04], a human can be a component
of a system, and thus a human can also bemodeled as a system. Only if the men-
tioned particular write access request happens, this dormant development fault
sets a flipflop in the circuit, which in turn activates the read signal of the memory
circuit and leads to the failure.
The same error can be caused by an external fault. Assume that this circuit is
operated in spaceand the circuit is not sufficiently protectedagainst the energetic
particles present at the operated orbit, e.g., by not using a chip with radiation-
hardened flipflops. Then, the energetic particle, which traverses through the cir-
cuit and induces enough charge to flip the flipflop bit controlling the read enable
signal, is an external fault. The bitflip event in the flipflop is an error. In most
cases, this bit gets overwriƦen with a correct value by a predecessor flipflop, and
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Figure 2.3: Fault, error and failure concepts illustrated on the system from fig-
ure 2.2. An error is a deviation from the correct system state. If the error happens
in the external state of a service delivered by the system, thus can be observed by
the user, then it is a failure. An error can be caused internally or externally.
Figure 2.4: Error propagation between systems. A provider failure can be fault
from the perspective of a user and cause an error in the user system.
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the bit error is corrected until a memory write request is received. In other cases,
it causes a failure.
Faultswhichare continuouslypresent in timeare calledpermanent faults, oth-
erwise we talk of transient faults. For instance, imagine a power transistor was
soldered incorrectly toacircuitboardandatransistorpin isdetachedduetostrong
vibrationsduring the launchofa space satellite. This is apermanent fault, because
an inspectionand repair is generallynotpartof a satellitemission. Another impor-
tant fault source is the radiation in space. Radiation can cause permanent faults
in circuits, if a circuit is exposed to radiation long enough that physical structures
on a die are damaged irreparably. The flipflop bitflips due to radiation which can
be overwriƦen in the next clock cycles are in contrast transient faults.
Some faults can be activated systematically in a determinable way, these are
hard faults. Hard in this contextmeans that a fault donot seem to change its reac-
tion and stays “hard”, when a determined input stimulus is applied on the system.
If the fault seems to be activated sporadically, then we talk of a soft fault. Gener-
ally, soft faults can only be reproduced under very complex and rare internal and
external conditions. A hard fault in the context of our example data processing
circuit, would be the development bug in the circuit, which easily gets activated
when a particular stimulus is applied to the system. On the other hand, if the fault
was not activated during the verification of the circuit due to an insufficient verifi-
cation coverage and only happens a single time in a month during the operation,
we talk of a soft fault. Note that hard and soft are terms about the fault activation
reproducibility and is dependent on the perception of a fault.
[Avi+04] identifies fault classeswhich are divided into threemajor groupings:
development, physical, and interaction faults. Development faultsarecauseddur-
ing engineering phase of a system. Physical faults are faults which are caused on
the hardware. Interaction faults arise due to faults at the use interface of systems
mainly by humans or generally by interference between systems. These group-
ings are overlapping, i.e., one fault can belong to two groupings, for instance an
insufficient verification coverage can lead to a physical development fault.
Theauthors identify that thereareno transientdevelopment faults. Due to the
similarity between the perceptions of soft development faults and transient phys-
ical faults, which cannot be easily reproduced, these two categories are bundled
as intermiƤent faults. This classification is illustrated in figure 2.5. Errors caused
by intermiƦent faults are called soft errors. If an error present in the system is not
noticed, then the error is latent, otherwise detected.
Note that the research community involved in the fault tolerance for mission-
critical digital systemsmostly uses the terms soft error for temporary upsets, and
hard error for permanent errors in electronics due to electromagnetic radiation
[Nic11], [BSV11, ch. 3], [KCR06, ch. 1], [Pet11, ch. 2]. The difference between the
meanings of hard and soft in fault tolerance community canbe seen infigures 2.5,
2.6, and 2.7. The errors are caused by various single event effects (SEE), whichwe
introduce separately in section 2.2.
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Figure 2.5: Due to similarity between soft development faults and transient physi-
cal faults, these are bundled as intermiƦent faults. Figure adapted from [Avi+04].
intermiƦent
fault soft error
Figure 2.6: Soft errors are caused by intermiƦent faults. This definition of soft
error in [Avi+04] differs from the definition commonly used in the fault tolerance
community (figure 2.7).
permanent= hard transient= soft
error
persistence
Figure 2.7: The meanings of soft and hard in fault tolerance community. Com-
pared to the taxonomy in [Avi+04] illustrated infigures2.5and2.6, fault tolerance
community usually uses the terms hard and soft for error persistence.
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Even we will not use the terms hard and soft as described in [Avi+04], other
fault tolerance concepts presented from [Avi+04] are generally used in fault tol-
erance community.
2.1.2 Means for dependability
In last subsection, we introduced the concepts of fault, error and failure, which
are three main threats to dependable computers. It is obvious that faults are the
source for errors as well as failures. Consequently, the concepts for themeans for
ensuring dependability are based on the word fault and are called:
• fault avoidance (goal: fault-free system)
– fault prevention
– fault removal
• fault acceptance (goal: living with faults)
– fault forecasting
– fault tolerance
Fault prevention happens mostly during development phase of a system and
aimstoavoidgenerationof faultsbyenablingmorerobustdevelopmentprocesses.
For instance, there are coding styles or standards for hardware descriptions used
inavionics,which limit theuseof somecoding languageconstructsor coding tech-
niqueswhichmay lead to faults in code. [CPB10] compiles someguidelines for the
hardware description language (HDL) VHDL.
Fault removal happens during development and operation phase of a system.
For instance, verification during HDL development is carried out to remove the
faults in the code. The faults in the HDL code are also called bugs. During oper-
ation, fault removal is mainly done during system maintenance. Maintenance is
an external countermeasure and a maintenance follows a failure or is done peri-
odically as preventivemeans. Due lack of physical access, a physical fault removal
is not practicable for space satellites, but a fault in the system software can be re-
moved for instance by removing the fault and reuploading to the satellite.
Fault forecasting tries to foresee faults by evaluating the systembehavior. The
evaluation can be done during development as well as in operation. For instance
as part of the quality assurance for satellite systems a fault detection, isolation
and recovery (FDIR) is prepared by analyzing the fault sources in the system and
checking the presence of themeans against the faults.
Fault tolerance tries to avoid system failures during operation with the help
of fault tolerance techniques. If the use environment of a dependable system in-
cludes external faults, then fault avoidance is not practicable and this systemmust
implement fault tolerance and/or fault forecasting.
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2.1.3 Fault tolerance
From the four means for dependability, the fault tolerance is the key concept for
this work and will be describedmore in detail.
[Avi+04] uses the following classification for fault tolerance techniques:
• error detection
– concurrent detection
– preemptive detection
• recovery
– error handling
* compensation
* rollback
* rollforward
– fault handling
* diagnosis
* isolation
* reconfiguration
* reinitialization
Error detection is the localization of errors in the system state. We speak of con-
current detection or concurrent error detection (CED) if the error detection can
be carried out continuously. Some examples are comparators for duplex systems
or error detecting codes for registers in circuits, which are active continuously in
time. An overview of CED techniques against bitflips will be handled in subsec-
tion 2.4.3more in detail.
Preemptive detection takes place outside the actual operation window of a
system. This means that the component delivering the the service is paused and
the tester component is active in the system. An example is the checking the in-
tegrity of data in the random accessmemories on a circuit after power-on, to pre-
vent a failure during data processing.
System recovery or simply recovery is the reaction to a detected error and tries
to create a system state which is free of errors (error handling), and undertakes
actions that the faults do not cause any errors (fault handling).
The first error handling technique is the compensation. Compensationmasks
the erroneous part of the system state, if sufficient redundancy for the system
state is present. For instance, if the state machine of a circuit is encoded using
Hamming-code, then single bit errors can be compensated by this system.
Rollback tries to go back to a error-free system state. This technique has the
advantage of restoring a prior state of the system with minimal data and time
loss and restarting processing from this state, especially if the system needs high
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amount of time to reach this state again. But this advantage comes at the cost of
extra space for saved system states, which are also called checkpoints. If a roll-
back is not possible, rollforward can be tried. Compared to an old, saved state,
rollforward restores a new error-free system state. Imagine a data processing cir-
cuitwhichperiodically stores checkpoints inamemory. Subsequently, a radiation-
induced bitflip happens in the statemachine, which gets detected due to one-hot
encoding. First, a rollback is tried, but the checkpoint is too old to restore. As
fallback, rollforward is tried by reseƦing the state machine and the start state is
restored.
Diagnosis is the evaluation of an error to findout the fault that led to the error.
Diagnosis normally happens in complex systems,when the causeof anerror is not
obvious, where an error can be caused by a long chain of threats.
Isolationkeeps the fault inadefinedareabymeansof logicalorelectricalmask-
ingwith theaimthat the faultdoesnotaffectneighboringsystemsbypropagating
through the systemboundaries. For instance, if a bit error is detected in a sequen-
tial circuit, then circuit’s outputs can be logically masked to avoid propagation of
erroneous data to neighboring circuits.
Reconfiguration involves reassigning of tasks to spare components in the sys-
tem. For instance, a data processing system with numerous identical processing
components can reassign a task from a failed processing component to another.
Finally, reinitializationmeansa restartof the system,bringing thesystemback
to its initial state. In caseof a complexhardware, this ismostly achievedby turning
the system off and on again. In case of a sequential circuit this equals to a reset of
the circuit.
A rollback or rollforward is usually followed by fault handling, especially if a
hard fault is expected in the system. For instance, let some data read from a flash
memory block has a bit error. The error is corrected with the help of Hamming
code, but the error handling determines that it is a hard fault. So, fault handling
proceeds and marks the damaged area in the flash memory that this area is not
used in future, otherwise the hard fault (the damaged flash cell) can be reacti-
vated again and cause another error. In this example error recovery is done by
compensation and isolation.
Faulthandlingcanalsoprecedeerrorhandling, if faulthandlingcanreact faster
thanerrorhandling. For instance, assumeasequential circuit in radiationenviron-
ment. During operation the circuit detects an error using parity. As the system
was designed for radiation environment, the system assumes this is a soft error.
Error handling is done using rollforward by a reset in the component, where the
error is detected, but the reset takes many clock cycles. So, the system isolates
the component that the error does not propagate to other components, by im-
mediately logicallymasking the primary outputs that can propagate the error, for
instance the control signals likewrite enable in memory interfaces. This isolation
is called fault isolation, because if an error propagates to the neighboring system,
it is an external fault from the neighboring system’s perspective. Note that this
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Figure 2.8: EDFT applied reference architecture labeled according to the taxon-
omy in [Avi+04]
example reflects the idea behind our recovery technique in chapter 6. In this case
fault tolerance is achieved by concurrent error detection with on-demand system
recovery, where fault handling (isolation) is done before error handling (rollfor-
ward).
Error detection and system recovery is also abbreviated as detection and re-
covery.
Figure 2.8 shows error detection–based fault tolerance (EDFT) applied on the
reference processing architecture from section 1.1, which is labeled according to
the taxonomywe introduced in this section.
2.2 Transient effects on sequential circuits
Thiswork concentrates on the transient bit errors in the flipflops of sequential cir-
cuits, which are mainly caused by radiation. Although we have introduced many
terms and concepts for dependability in last sections, we will further introduce
terms used in fault tolerance against radiation-induced errors. These are impor-
tant for understanding our fault model in this work. Different works on fault tol-
erance can have differentworking terms andwewill present the definitions intro-
duced in [Pet11, ch. 2], but also add some remarks on the use of these terms in
fault tolerance community.
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A local effect caused on a systemby interaction of a single energetic particle is
called a single event effect (SEE). Other (not caused by only a single particle) ra-
diation effects are due to cumulative dose of these particles on a long term, e.g.,
total ionizing dose, which can affect the circuit performance in long term. An SEE
can result in local corruption of information stored in a node, which is called a sin-
gle event upset (SEU). In other words, an SEU is a corrupted electrical state. An
upset in turn can result in transient, permanent, or static errors.
Transient errors are visible as deviations from the normal signal state in a lim-
ited time interval generally less than the duration of a clock cycle, for instance a
transient peak on the output of a circuit gate that lasts only a fraction of the clock
cycle duration.
Permanent errors are mostly caused by damage on circuit components, e.g.,
a destroyed power transistor due to radiation. These errors are also called hard
errors. Permanent errors are not themotivation of this work.
Static errors, which are caused by transient errors geƦing latched by the cir-
cuit, can be corrected by, e.g., a reset, and these errors are also called soft errors.
Soft errors often happen in the memory elements in form of bitflips and if uncor-
rected, thesemay propagate through the circuit andmay lead to a system failure.
Nevertheless, there are many inherent structures on a circuit, which prevent the
radiation-induced faults from causing errors. These structures are latching win-
dow of sequential components, as well as electrical- and logical-barriers of com-
binational components [Lid+94].
Note that according to the taxonomy in [Avi+04], a soft error canbe causedby
soft permanent faults or transient faults, which is amore broaddefinition. In fault
tolerance community, soft errors are usually transient bit errors,which are caused
by SEEs, and which can be recovered from by a reset. As this work is motivated
by radiation-induced transient faults in flipflops, we will refer to the bit errors by
using the term soft error, same as how the fault tolerance community calls it.
Moreover, the term transient error introduced formerly is usually called single
event transient (SET) in fault tolerance community, but [Pet11] does not use this
term at all. Also, the term SEU is used in [Pet11] in amore general contextmaking
the transient pulses on a net an SEU, so these transient pulses on electrical nets
are seen as a corrupted electrical state. Even the definitions make sense in their
context, in fault tolerance community, these two termsaremostly usedas follows:
• SEU as bitflips inmemory components
• SET as transient pulses on combinational nets
As working terms, wewill use SET for transient voltage pulses on a circuit net,
and SEU or bitflip for flipped bit in a flipflop, as these terms are more common in
the fault tolerance community.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 summarize the discussion about different terms used in
[Pet11] and fault tolerance community.
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Figure 2.9: Classification of SEUs according to [Pet11]. [Pet11] does not use the
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Figure 2.10: Compared to [Pet11], the terms SET and SEU are used to differenti-
ate the effects on combinational on sequential elements. These termswill also be
used in this work as working terms.
2.3 Fault model used in this work
The motivation of this work is to recover a sequential circuit from the erroneous
state caused by the bitflips in flipflops, and bitflips can be caused by variousways.
In this section, we describe the faults that we are hardening our system against.
SEUs and SETs are themost common functional transient radiation faults that
happen on the gate level. An SET can happen on every net of a circuit and can be
seen as a transient voltage pulse on a net. If such a change happens on a data
net and then latched by a flipflop, this transient can lead to a bitflip in the flipflop.
But an SET can also happen directly on a net inside the flipflop itself and possibly
flip the state of the flipflop. An upset of the flipflop bit due to a single energetic
particle is called an SEU.
Bitflips due to SETs are rarer than SEUs, because:
• a striking particle must induce enough energy on a circuit net to cause an
SET, which depends on the electrical capacitance of the regarding net
• the combinatorics must pass the SET to the input of a flipflop to have the
chance to be registered
• the SET must be effective during the time window when a sequential ele-
ment is transparent that the SET gets registered
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With shrinking feature sizes, the electrical capacitance of circuits nets decrease,
which increases the error rate due to both SETs and SEUs. With increasing fre-
quencies, especially the probability that an SET gets registered increases. There-
fore the errors due to SETs are frequency dependent.
An SET, and thus also an SEU, are asynchronous events by nature. If an SET
occurs during setup or hold times of an flipflop, this can lead tometastability and
thus to a indeterminable state of the flipflop. An SET can be detrimental on global
nets like clock or reset but also on shared data nets.
A recommended fault tolerance strategy against an SET is to triplicate global
signalsor touse temporal redundancyby introducingdelayelements,which intro-
duce signal delays that are longer than the maximum duration of a voltage pulse
caused by an SET and compare a net with its delayed value. On the other hand,
space redundancy like LTMR is used against an SEU on flipflops [Ber08]. Conse-
quently, a sufficient fault tolerance strategy against functional errors should ac-
commodate both temporal and space redundancy.
In this work, we focus only on SEUs which occur directly inside the flipflops,
andnoton sharednets,which can causemultiplebitflips. Our faultmodel is based
on the following assumptions:
• only SEUs happen
• SEUs happen on a discrete time domain
• SEUs happen synchronously to the circuit clock
Consequently:
• the faults appear as single bitflip errors
• an SEU happens inside a single clock cycle and it is not relevant where an
SEU happens inside a clock cycle
• if an SEU happens during a clock cycle, then the error is only observable in
the next clock cycle and subsequent cycles
We focus only on SEUs, becausemost of the evaluations in thiswork are based
on the the well-known FPGA for space applications, the ProASIC3. According to
[PGG11], bitflips caused in ProASIC3’s flipflops aremainly due to SEUs. ProASIC3
is discussed in section 2.6more in detail.
With feature sizes further decreasing, onewould expect that the errors due to
SETs increase compared to the errors caused by SEUs. Recent technology nodes
showanopposite behavior. For instance, [GSZ09] states that the error rate due to
combinational elements is below30%of error rate causedby sequential elements
at 32 nm feature size, even itwaspredicted that the contributionof combinational
and sequential elements should be equal at this technology node. [Sei+12] states
that the error rate of 22 nm technology shows very small increase in error rate due
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to combinational SETs compared to sequential SEUs and notes that the error rate
due combinational SETs remain below the projections in earlier publications.
We assume that SEUs happen on a discrete timedomain and synchronously to
the circuit clock, becauseananalysis ona continuous timedomaindependson the
path delays of a routed circuit, and on the setup- and hold-times of the flipflops.
2.4 Fault tolerance techniques against SEUs
The fault tolerance against SEUs canbe implemented at various abstraction levels
of a computing system, e.g.:
• fabrication process level
• chip layout level
• logic level
• architecture level
• software level
• algorithm level
Some fault tolerance techniques are based on combination of techniques present
on many abstraction levels. For example, a software component reacts to an ex-
ception which was caused by the arithmetic unit of a processor.
At the lowest level of abstraction, a digital circuit canbemade fault-tolerant by
selecting special materials or a special chipmanufacturing process. Hardening at
this level is usually called radiation hardening by process (RHBP). When the chip
manufacturing process is fixed, we arrive at the design level. Designmeans using
the available building blocks to create a system,where the building blocks usually
start at transistors can go to individual software modules and further. Harden-
ing a system at design level is also called radiation hardening by design (RHBD).
RHBD depends strictly on the wise use of components that the designer has ac-
cess to. For instance an FPGA circuit designer can only use the building blocks of
the chosen FPGA, namely the configurable logic blocks (CLB) and the routing in-
frastructure (also called interconnect). It is noteworthy that some systems which
are not explicitly hardened can still show an inherent fault tolerance against radi-
ation. [Bla12] calls this kind of hardeningby luck radiation hardeningby serendip-
ity (RHBS).
Now,wewill traverse throughvariousabstraction levelsandgiveexample fault
tolerance techniques at each level.
Implementing a system at a high abstraction level can be less time consuming
and can comeat lower costs due to reuseof existing solutions. This savingalso ap-
plies to fault tolerance. For instance, implementing fault tolerance at the software
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level provides more flexibility and it is usually cheaper compared to the incorpo-
ration of a special chip manufacturing process, as manufacturing a custom chip
creates high costs compared to software. Therefore, many systems for deploying
in radiation environment are implemented using broadly available, i.e., commer-
cial chips along with RHBD. This rule can be also repeated at other abstraction
levels: It is usually cheaper to use commercially, broadly available systems than a
system for a nichemarket, or to develop it from scratch.
Nevertheless it is important to state that the advantage of implementing fault
tolerance in higher levels is not always true. RHBD has also its limits, and depen-
dent on the mission requirements, the designermust implement fault tolerance
additionally at lower levels. A remarkable example is hardening against the total
ionizing dose (TID) in space, which can slowly degrade the performance of a dig-
ital circuit through the mission time. At the application level of an FPGA usually
there is noway to harden against TID, andhardening against TID effects is usually
achieved at the process level [Bla12]. Another example is system level TMR. For
instance, first it may seem trivial to triplicate an on-board computer for a satellite
for fault tolerance, but the voting and the system recovery in case of an error or
failure still needs a significant portion of engineering work andmay not be cheap
as using two on-board computers with fault tolerance implemented at lower ab-
straction levels.
In the next subsections, we present an overview of fault tolerance techniques
against SEUs at various abstraction levels.
TMRisawell-knowntechnique,whichcanbe implementedonvariousabstrac-
tion levels of a system. Our evaluations in the coming chapters are based on TMR
implemented on logic level, therefore this technique will be discussed in its own
subsection.
Last but not least, it is noteworthy that we discuss in this section only about
fault tolerance against SEUs, becausemost our fault model is based on SEUs (see
section 2.3). Generally, a digital circuit for a mission-critical application in space
should also pay aƦention not only to other radiation effects, but also incorpo-
rate additional means to ensure dependability in various abstraction levels, e.g.,
fault removal, fault forecasting, fault prevention, which we discussed in subsec-
tion 2.1.2.
2.4.1 Fabrication process level techniques
Fault tolerance at the fabrication process level or shortly process level resembles
the means used in the respective chip manufacturing process. Usually, chips are
manufactured in fabs using commercial very-large-scale integration (VLSI) pro-
cesses which are aimed at high yields and low costs. For applications with spe-
cial needs, other manufacturing processes can be used. For instance radiation-
hardened processes incorporate dense delay elements like resistors and capaci-
tors that can be used in the feedback path of latches. These resistors and capac-
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itors can then increase the delay of the feedback path and protect against SEUs.
Usually, commercial processes do not provide this kind of dense delay elements,
so obtaining a similar feedback pathwith a commercial process could be impossi-
ble or with additional area penalties.
Another example for a process level fault tolerance technique is using silicon
on insulator (SOI) technology in the wafer manufacturing process. [Col04, part
8.3.2] discusses the use of SOI in circuits for radiation environments and states
that memories based on SOI technology have a lower soft error rate than their
counterparts,whicharebasedon theconventionalCMOS(complementarymetal-
oxide-semiconductor) technology. For example, a comparison of SEU cross sec-
tion (the number of SEUs in a specific radiation test normalized by the total num-
ber of irradiated particles and total memory bits, i.e., a normalized error rate) be-
tweenanSOIandconventionalPowerPCprocessorwithsimilar featuresize shows
that cross section of the SOI processor is about one magnitude lower than the
cross section of the conventional counterpart [Iro+03].
2.4.2 Chip layout level techniques
Chip layout level resembles the drawingof polygons, vias, transistors, use of cells,
gates, and floorplanning to create a chip. At the low level, a chip designer can re-
duce the SEU vulnerability for instance by layouting in such away that a sufficient
critical charge is ensured. Ahigher critical charge results ina lowerSEUvulnerabil-
ity, because a striking energetic particle has to bring thenmore energy to neutral-
ize this charge and cause a voltage level that represents the opposite logic level,
namely a bitflip. [Bla12] discusses some RHBD techniques at the chip layout level
not only limited to hardening against SEUs.
A well-known RHBD technique at chip layout level is dual interlocked state
cell (DICE) for memory elements [CNV96]. DICE is based on space redundancy
and is implemented as follows: A standard SRAM memory cell is based on one
bistable element. Basically, DICE introduces three additional bistable elements
which are chained in a loop, see figure 2.11. Every bistable element has twoneigh-
boring bistable elements, which can isolate their neighbors from each other de-
pendent on the memory state. So, if there is an SET on one of the bistable ele-
ments, this transient is not propagated to other elements. When the transient ef-
fect has ended, the feedback from the neighboring bistable element restores the
state of the corrupt element. Usually, a standard SRAM cell is based on 6 transis-
tors andDICE uses 12 transistors, so DICE has an area overhead of 1. For instance
DICE cells are included inmany space-grade FPGAs like Atmel ATF280F, Aeroflex
UT6325 and Xilinx Virtex-5QV [Ber12].
Radiation susceptibility of the DICE can be further improved by using a differ-
ent layout approach called LEAP [Kel+10]. According to [Kel+10], LEAP-DICE im-
proves the error rate of DICE and conventional flipflop by a factor of 5 and 2000,
respectively. Additionally, LEAP-DICEflipflopsare less susceptible tomultiplebit-
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Figure 2.11: The left figure shows a bistable element, i.e., one bit memory ab-
stracted by two inverters. On the right, a DICE cell is depicted, which consists of
four bistable elements that are chained in a loop.
flips caused by a single particle.
2.4.3 Logic level techniques
Logic level techniques work mainly on the bit level can be applied on various ab-
straction levels that work with bits.
Error detecting codes and error detecting and correcting codes are based on
the bit level redundancy. The aim of these codes is to achieve beƦer results than
duplication in case of error detection, and triplication in case of error detection
and correction. In digital circuits, they are used in online testing [NZ98] and con-
current error detection (CED). Some examples against bit corruption are parity,
dual-rail,m-out-of-n, andarithmetic code forerrordetection, andHamming,BCH,
and Reed-Solomon code for error correction.
Many concurrent errordetection (CED) is basedon logic level techniques. CED
is based on error detection during the normal operation of a system. CED is usu-
ally implementedby anadditional checker circuit, which checks an invariant prop-
erty of the target system [NZ98]. Note that CED can also be implemented on var-
ious other system state properties like temperature and power, but in this work
we confine us to the techniques relevant against bitflips.
In parity checking (called parity-based error detection (PBED) in this work), a
parity bit is added to every data word being stored, e.g., by XORing the data bits
and storing the result alongwith the data word. Upon reading the data word, the
parity is calculated again, compared to the storedparity value and in case of amis-
match, an error signal is asserted. Subsequently, an error handler can react and
initiate a system recovery scheme. Parity checking is used for instance in the level
1 cacheof theprocessorsof the IBMS/390G5system[SG99]andon theexecution
unit registers of a SPARC processor [And+03].
Error correcting codes add enough redundancy to data to enable correcting of
bit errors. Hamming code is commonly used in circuits to encode memory data.
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Even it can also be used for hardening the registers in a circuit, simple replication
of registers is preferred (e.g., triplication and voting), because replication has less
impacts on the critical path of a circuit. Some techniques are based on arithmetic
properties of special functional units. For instance residue codes are based on the
following equality:
(x · y) mod m = ((x mod m) · (y mod m)) mod m
Modulo for binary numbers can be efficiently implemented by calculatingmodulo
of single bits and summing them. This principle is for instance used in a multiply
unit of a SPARC processor [And+03].
If a circuit has only bitflips in onedirection, i.e., only one to zero, or zero to one,
then a sum code can be used. In sum code, the number of ones or zeros are coded
in binary and aƦached to the information word. So, an information word with n
bits has ⌈log2(n+ 1)⌉ checkbits. This code is also called Berger code [Ber61].
2.4.4 Triplemodular redundancy on logic level
Awell-knownRHBD techniquewhich canbe used atmost abstraction levels is the
triple modular redundancy (TMR). The principle of TMR originates from 1960s
[Arm61; LV62]. In TMR one module is triplicated and the outputs of the three
modules are input to a voter, which outputs the majority value. Amodule in this
sense can be anything from awhole system to a small functional block or simply a
gate.
In coming chapters, we will evaluate our proposed fault tolerance technique
and this evaluation includes also a comparison to the state-of-the-art hardening
techniqueTMRonaflash-basedFPGA. Due to this reason,wepresent some com-
mon TMR techniques applied on the application level of an FPGA.
There are various TMR techniques based on the reliability requirements of a
circuit. Following list depicts a list of TMR techniques for FPGAs according to
[Ber08], which can be applied at the application level of an FPGA. These prin-
ciples can also be applied to digital circuits:
• local TMR
• distributed TMR
• global TMR
In local TMR (LTMR), a combinational net being registered by a flipflop is con-
nected to two additional flipflops and the outputs of the three flipflops are con-
nected to a majority voter. The distributed TMR additionally triplicates the com-
binational data paths, so the combinatorics including the majority voter is also
triplicated. Finally, the global TMR takes also transient effects on clock nets into
account and triplicates the clock net, where every clock net supplies one partic-
ular flipflop of a triplicated data path. Local, distributed, global TMR and their
differences are illustrated in figures 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14.
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Figure 2.12: Application of local triple modular redundancy on user logic
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Figure 2.13: Distributed TMR triplicates every data path. So, every data path for
combinatorics requires its ownmajority voter compared to LTMR,where the data
path for combinatorics is shared.
logic FF majorityvoter logic
logic FF majorityvoter logic
logic FF majorityvoter logic
clock
Figure 2.14: Global TMR additionally triplicates the clock lines for each data path
compared to DTMR
28 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
LTMR protects against SEUs, but if an SET on combinatorics is latched by a
flipflop, it leads to an SEU. With increasing circuit frequency, the latching proba-
bility also increases. DTMRmakes the SEUs due to SETs frequency independent,
but SETs can still happen on global clock nets and affect many flipflops at once.
Global TMR solves this problem by additionally triplicating the clock lines.
In this work, only bitflips in flipflops are considered. Consequently, the LTMR
is used as the compared TMR technique in our evaluations.
Presented TMR techniques detect and correct a single bit error on an flipflop
locally using amajority voter, hence the TMR can be automatically applied on top
of a circuit. This makes TMR functionally transparent to the rest of the system,
consequently the circuitmostly does not require a redesign beforemapping to an
FPGA.
2.4.5 Architecture level
Architectureormicro-architecture resembles thespecific implementationofapro-
cessor, including how the pipeline is structured, how many cores are integrated,
how is the cache organized.
Fault tolerance techniques at architecture level try to exploit theflexibility pro-
videdat this level. For instance, instructionscanbechecked for integrityor threads
can be runmultiple times to detect errors.
Modular redundancyapproach is alsoused todetect andcorrect errors in func-
tional units of a processor core. For example, IBM S/390G5 processor uses dupli-
cated instruction-fetch and -execution units in the pipeline. If the outputs are the
same then the recovery unit places the new state for the pipeline in a buffer. If
an error is detected, then the instruction is retried, if the error repeats, then the
processor halts [SG99].
Modular redundancy causes at least 100% overhead. Alternative approaches
useabstracted informationofanapplication tomonitor thepipeline. For instance,
the static control- and data-flowgraph of an application binary can be loaded into
amonitoring unit, which checks then for error during runtime [MBS08].
2.4.6 Software level
Software approaches generally work on the instruction level by augmenting the
compiled binary with additional instructions for checking the control- and data-
flow of an application. Well-known techniques are runtime software assertions,
control- and data-path checking, and instruction duplication. Some techniques
will be discussed in chapter 3 in detail.
Themainadvantageof softwareapproaches is theflexibilitydue tohigher level
of abstraction. The application developer can use this flexibility to implement the
fault tolerance needed by a specific application.
The downside of software-only approaches is the limited error rate improve-
ment. For example, a software application on a processor with LEAP-DICE hard-
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ened flipflops can achieve an error-rate improvement factor up to 5000, where a
software-only approach based on duplicated instructions can achieve only up to
38 [Che+16b].
2.4.7 Algorithm level
Thealgorithm level techniquesexploit thecharacteristicsofa specificalgorithmto
check the integrity of intermediate or end results. For this purpose, the algorithm
is augmented with additional checks and recovery.
For instance, [HA84] detects and corrects errors in matrix computations by
augmenting the operands with additional checksums and distributes the compu-
tations tomultiple processing units to avoid single point of failure.
Thedifferenceofalgorithm- tosoftware-level is thatalgorithmlevel techniques
are application specific, which is also themain disadvantage.
2.5 FPGAs used inmission-critical applications
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are often utilized in space avionics due
to their processing efficiency, reprogrammability, and extensible interface capa-
bilities; providing flexibility for a range of mission requirements.
FPGAs store the software for their circuit programming information, i.e., con-
figuration, in the configuration memory. Currently, the commercially available
FPGAs used in mission-critical applications use the following types of configura-
tionmemory:
• SRAM
• flash
• antifuse
The majority of the off-the-shelf FPGAs are SRAM-based. Known companies
for SRAM-based FPGAs are Xilinx, Altera, Siliconblue (acquired by LaƦice Semi-
conductor in 2011) and Atmel. Most of the commercially-available FPGAs man-
ufactured by these companies are not designed for space. Although it is possi-
ble to use some of the ordinary (not mission-critical applications) FPGAs in non-
crucial experimental payloads in space, for mission-critical applications like on-
board data handling unit, space-grade FPGAs are preferred. Some SRAM-based
FPGAs for space are Virtex-5QV (also referred as single event immune reconfig-
urableFPGA(SIRF)),Virtex-4QVdesignedbyXilinx, andATF280F,ATFEE560(two
ATF280Fs with two EEPROMs in a package) designed by Atmel. All the men-
tioned FPGAs but the Virtex-4QV have built-in fault tolerance against radiation-
induced faults and usually no further hardening on application-level (e.g., apply-
ing TMR at the netlist level) is needed [Xili14; Atme15a; Atme15b].
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Table 2.1: Number of SEUs in a circuit with 5000flipflops and 8Kib memory dur-
ing a one yearmission in L2 orbit under 1/cm² shielding for different FPGAs based
on a fault model. Data taken from [BSV11, ch. 7].
device conf. mem. RAM FF
Virtex-4QV 344430 3747 2188
RTPE3000L (RT ProASIC3) 0 62 4
ATF280F ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0
The flash- and antifuse-based FPGAs were brought to market by Actel, which
was acquired by the semiconductor companyMicrosemi in 2010. Anothermanu-
facturer of antifuse-based FPGAs is Aeroflex. The antifuse and flash memories
have lower vulnerability to radiation-induced faults compared to SRAM, there-
fore FPGAs based on these memory technologies are popular in radiation envi-
ronment. Another advantage is the instant availability of the FPGA application
after powerup, because the configuration does not have to be loaded from an ex-
ternal memory compared to SRAM-based FPGAs. Moreover, SRAM-based FP-
GAs need usually external non-volatile configuration memory to be additionally
deployed on the system board or in the chip package (e.g., ATFFE560 FPGA).
Last but not least, antifuse and flash memories consume less power than SRAM,
because SRAM is volatile, in other words, energy is needed to keep the data on
SRAM. Some popular space-grade FPGAs from Microsemi are RTAX [Micr15b],
RT ProASIC3 [Rez10] and RTG4 [Micr16]. Aeroflex provides the antifuse-based
FPGAUT6325 [Aero13].
RTAX is antifuse-based and was the main FPGA choice for space applications
before the space-grade flash- and SRAM-based FPGAs were available. The fact
that this FPGA is available more than ten years ([Wan04]) gives RTAX also an ad-
ditional advantage of heritage. This is contradictory to the short life cycle of com-
mercial digital circuits, but heritage of components is one of the key factors in
space that can be seen as on-field testing of a component and contributes to the
trust aƦributed to the component.
Themost important drawback of antifuse- and flash-based FPGAs is that they
often do not provide much resources as their SRAM-based counterparts. In the
sparsely populated area of space-grade FPGAs, Microsemi recently introduced
theFPGARTG4with comparable resources, though. Anotherdrawback is the lim-
ited reprogrammability compared to SRAM. Antifuse-based FPGAs are one-time
programmable and flashmemories have usually a limited program/erase cycle.
Table 2.1 compares vulnerabilities of three different FPGAS: one FPGA with
built-in fault tolerance (ATF280F), and two FPGAs that have to be hardened on
the application level, SRAM-based Virtex-4QV and flash-based RTPE3000L.
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2.6 Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA
In our evaluationswe use a popular off-the-shelf flash-based field-programmable
gate array (FPGA) formission-critical applications, theProASIC3. ProASIC3FPGA
family was introduced back in 2005 [Mor05] by the company Actel. In the follow-
ing years, other family products based on the same architecture with additional
features like more interfaces and low-power were introduced, especially the RT
ProASIC3. RT stands for radiation-tolerant. RT ProASIC3 (also called RT3P) is
basedona low-powerproduct (A3PL)and isavailable (introduced in2010[Rez10],
commercially available since 2012 [EEJo12]) in an airtight (hermetically-sealed)
ceramic package and is tested againstmilitary standards. The flash-based config-
urationmemory and the availability of a special chip package for extremeenviron-
ments aswell as additional testing againstmilitary standards (RTProASIC)makes
ProASIC3 very popular for mission-critical applications like aerospace.
As mentioned in section 2.5, heritage is a key factor in mission-critical appli-
cations. Even the ProASIC3 architecture dates back to 2005 and its space-grade
package isavailablesince2010, it is still state-of-the-art for spacemissions [VSC15;
Tre+14].
Usually, FPGAs realize a given application by using the building blocks avail-
able on the chip, namely configurable logic blocks (CLB). In ProASIC3, the CLBs
can be either configured as a flipflop or three-input look-up table (LUT), which is
contrary to popular CLB architectureswhere a CLB can simultaneously be config-
ured a flipflop and LUT.
ProASIC3 is based on a semiconductor process with 130nm feature size. Ac-
cording to irradiation tests on RTPE3000L [PGG11], the direct SEU effects inside
the flipflops aremore significant compared to the SETs on combinational compo-
nents latched by the flipflops. Due to the same reason, [PGG11] observed that
hardening against SETs using filters on the flipflop inputs (ANDing the delayed
and undelayed flipflop input signal) does not have any significant effect on the er-
ror rate of the irradiated circuit.
2.7 Error detection–based fault tolerance
After the introduction of fault tolerance concepts, we present our approachmore
in detail.
In our approach, the target system that has be hardened can be abstracted
as two systems. The first one is hardware, i.e., is implemented as a circuit, and
provides a service. The second one is the user, which can be both hardware or
software. Figure 2.15 visualizes these two systems.
On hardware, detection of an error requires space or time redundancy, but
often less redundancy resources than both detection and correction. If the re-
sources on a device are scarce and costly, then implementing a local error cor-
rection scheme can become a hurdle. In this case, system recovery can be done
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service
user
(SW or HW)
service
provider
(HW)
unhardened system
Figure 2.15: Abstract model of the reference architecture presented in section 1.1
by recomputation, e.g., by retrying the last processing request in software or ad-
ditional circuit buffering the last request. Issuing a non-local error correction re-
quires more recovery time than a local correction, beginning from the detection
until the hardware is recovered from the erroneous state and recomputation is
done. Nevertheless, if the error rate of the system is low, then an on-demand sys-
tem recovery can be practicable.
After an error, a module must be recovered to an operational state. Often,
this is done by reseƦing the module to its initial state. This in turn leads to a loss
of the processing context that must be brought back, which involves periodically
backing up the processing context, i.e., checkpointing. If the processing context
does not contain any information which is needed for a long time, i.e., when a
module regularly falls back to a defined state, then the overhead of checkpoint-
ing in the circuit may be eliminated by reissuing a processing request. Examples
for such a module are a protocol converter or simply a module which exchanges
data between two modules after reformaƦing data. These modules do not have
to store an information for a long time and have a defined state after a chunk of
dataor a transaction is processed. Theexample circuit B thatwaspresented infig-
ure 1.1 falls also in this category, as it only exchanges data between twomodules
andmoves to its initial state after a request is processed. If an error occurs during
processing of a request, then the error handler can reset the processing module
and flag an error to the processor that a processing request can be reissued, i.e.,
software-based retry. Alternatively, instead of flagging, the request can be reis-
sued after a nonresponsive timeout. In this case, the time penalty caused by an
error is negligible, if the FPGA SEU rates during a mission due to space radiation
are low.
We refer to this technique as error detection–based fault tolerance (EDFT) in
this work. We evaluated EDFT using parity-based error detection, circuit reset,
and circuit isolation on the service provider side, and transaction-based process-
ingon theserviceuser side. Figure2.16showsEDFTappliedon thesystemalready
shown in figure 2.15. EDFT’s components will be presented and evaluated sepa-
rately using example implementations in next chapters.
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Figure 2.16: EDFT applied on the system in figure 2.15. The components are clas-
sified according to [Avi+04]
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Chapter 3
Relatedwork
In section 2.4, we gave an overview of fault tolerance techniques at different ab-
straction levels. In this chapter, we discuss close related work.
An important contribution of this work is that it evaluates a concrete imple-
mentation of parity-based error detection with recomputation on a known FPGA
for space applications. To thebest of our knowledge, there is nowork in literature,
which evaluates a similar fault tolerance technique on a similar device. So, wewill
present related work from amore general perspective.
Ourworkproposesahybridapproachbycombining fault toleranceat software
and hardware level to use the advantages of high-level and low-level fault toler-
ance techniques. Wewill present first a well-known software-level fault tolerance
approach, then awork showing the limits of software approaches. Finally, we dis-
cuss amore general and recent work, which combineswell-known fault tolerance
techniques fromvarious levels to achieve a system fault tolerance in termsof area,
timing, power, and error detection improvement.
3.1 Error detection by duplicated instructions
EDDI’s fault model is based on single bitflips in a processor. EDDI tries to detect
the errors which happen during program execution by executing the instructions
twice on two different sets of general purpose registers and programmemory ad-
dresses. The error detection happens before executing a branch or store instruc-
tion. EDDI is applied as follows.
Firstly, a instruction dependency graph for the program is generated, which
shows the data dependencies between particular instructions and plays an im-
portant rule in instruction scheduling. Then, using the sequenced instructions,
the storeless basic block graph (SBB) of the program is constructed. First let us
explain the concept of basic block.
Theconceptbasicblock iswell-known incompilerdesign. Itdefinesasequence
of instructions,where it isalwaysguaranteedthatevery instruction in thesequence
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...
store or branch instruction
...
store or branch
...
store or branch
storeless basic block (SBB) graph
instruction0
...
instructioni
user program
SBB graph
construction
Figure 3.1: Storeless basic block (SBB) construction. The well-known concept of
basic block is augmented by the property storeless, because the error detection is
done before a branch or store instruction in EDDI.
will be executed before the coming instructions in the sequence. Put differently,
a basic block can only be entered by a jump to the first instruction, and exited by
using the last instruction in the sequence without any jumps to the instructions
between the first and last instruction. Examples for the last instruction in a basic
block are jump, branch, and return instructions.
EDDI augments the basic block concept by adding the storeless property, be-
cause the error detection happens prior to a branch or store instruction. SBB con-
struction is illustrated in figure 3.1.
The faultmodel of EDDI is based on bitflips inmemory such as registers in the
processor, program and code memory. To detect the bitflips in registers and pro-
grammemory, these are partitioned inmaster and shadow sections. The instruc-
tions of the user program are limited to the master components. For illustration,
see figure 3.2.
Then, the instructions are duplicated, and transformed such that the dupli-
cated instructions operate on the shadow registers and memory, see figure 3.3
for illustration. The duplicated SBB is then added to the dependency graph.
After instructionduplication, the instructions forerrordetectionare introduced
into the dependency graph. The instruction compares the registers which decide
theoutcomeof abranch instruction, orwhichwill be stored inmemory, and jumps
to system recovery code in case of amismatch. See figure 3.4.
Finally, the scheduling is carried out. The instructionsmust be scheduled such
that the error detectionprobability is high. For instance, if themaster and shadow
(duplicated) instructions are interleaved, i.e., if a shadow instruction always fol-
lows amaster instruction, this leads to an error detection probability of about 0.5
for bitflips causing unintentional jumps in code. In case of interleaved instruc-
tions, if the unintentional jump is to a master instruction, then both the master
and shadow instructionswill operateon the samedata values and the comparison
at the end of an SBB will not yield an error. The solution presented in [OSM02] is
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Figure 3.2: Partitioning of general purpose registers and programmemory
...
regz ← mem[m]
regx ← regy + regz
...
master SBB
...
regz+ r2 ← mem[m+ a2 ]
regx+ r2 ← regy+ r2 + regz+ r2
...
shadow SBB
instruction
duplication
Figure 3.3: Instructions of the user program are duplicated and transformed to
operate on the shadow registers andmemory
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branch if(regx ̸= regx+ r2 )
to system recovery
compare instruction
...
branch if(regx > 0)
to SBBi,master
master SBB
...
branch if(regx+ r2 > 0)
to SBBi,shadow
shadow SBB
Figure 3.4: Error detection is done before a branch or store instruction. For this
purpose, the register which decides a branch or will be stored in memory is com-
pared to its shadow.
to have twomaster instructions at the beginning of an SBB.
There are also other errors which can go undetected, but they are not covered
here. The error detection coverage is dependent on the application. [OSM02]
states an error detection coverage of about 0.98 to 0.99 for EDDI according to
fault injection experiments. The same measure for unhardened programs varies
from0.93 to 0.54.
EDDI causes an execution time overhead due to duplicated instructions and
added comparisons, which should be greater than 1. But the authors’ are moti-
vated by a superscalar processing architecture, where EDDI can be used to maxi-
mize instruction level parallelism.
EDDI’s execution time overhead is also application dependent and varies be-
tween 0.45 and 1.14 on a superscalar processor which can issue four instructions
per cycle.
Duplication technique can also be implemented on source code level, e.g, du-
plicating the variables and operations on the variables in C code and comparing a
variable with its duplicate whenever a variable is used like in figure 3.5 [Reb+99].
This approach lowers the error detection coverage and also yields a worse execu-
tion overhead.
A recovery proceduremust be implemented in EDDI, but [OSM02] do not give
any details about the recovery procedure nor if the recovery was included in the
evaluation.
It is also important to note that the fault injection was done only on the code
section of the program. Fault injection on the flipflop level can lead to less error
detection rate, e.g., [Che+16b] states an error coverage of 0.86.
Moreover, [Che+16b] notes that reading and comparing the values after stor-
ing them to memory (store-readback) can lead to a higher error detection cover-
age.
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int a, b;
...
a = b+5;
...
user program
int a, b,
a_dupl, b_dupl;
...
a = b+5;
a_dupl = b_dupl+5;
if (a != a_dupl)
recovery();
...
hardened program
Figure 3.5: Application of the EDDI technique on source code level. Every vari-
able is duplicated. An operation on a variable is repeated on its duplicate. After
a variable is used as a tight operand, the variable is compared to its duplicate. A
recovery procedure handles the error.
3.2 Limitations of software-based techniques
In section 3.1, we discussed EDDI, a well-known software-based fault tolerance
technique, which uses only bitflips onmemory elements as the fault model and is
evaluated on a superscalar processor. In this section, we discuss [Aza+11], which
evaluates additional software-based techniques and also includes errors caused
by transients in combinational components. Thiswork also analyzes the fault cov-
erage contribution of the evaluated software techniques one by one.
The compared techniques are:
• instruction duplication (EDDI)
• signatures for basic blocks
• inverted branches
While EDDI concentrates on the data, the laƦer two techniques try to observe
the control flow by detecting unintentional jumps in the program flow. For in-
stance, an error affecting the program counter can lead to such an error, which
can sometimes cannot be detected by EDDI.
Signatures for basic blocks can be used to observe the program flow. In this
technique, a distinct signature given to every basic block. The signature is loaded
to a global memory resource whenever a basic block is entered, and the signa-
ture is checked, whenever a basic block is exited. This principle is illustrated in
figure 3.6.
The technique inverted branches is based on duplication of branch instruc-
tions for checking whether the branch operation was executed correctly or not.
A branch operation has generally two possible jump positions, either the next ad-
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basic blockx
user program
move signaturex to register
basic blockx
branch if (signaturex ̸= register) to recovery
hardened program
Figure 3.6: Error detection in the control flow of software by using signatures for
basic blocks. The signature is loaded at the beginning and checked at the end of a
basic block.
...
branch if (condition) to x
instructiona+1
instructiona+2
...
instructionx
...
user program
a+ 0
a+ 1
a+ 2
x+ 0
...
branch if (condition) to x− 1
branch if (condition) to recovery
instructiona+1
instructiona+2
...
branch if (condition) to recovery
instructionx
...
hardened program
a+ 0
a+ 1
a+ 2
a+ 3
x− 1
x+ 0
Figure 3.7: Error detection in the control flowof software by duplication of branch
instructions
dress or the branch address, so the duplicate is placed on both potential desti-
nations. Branch instruction duplication and jump to recovery can be fusioned in
one instruction by inverting the branch condition in the branch instruction placed
at the branch address, and leaving the branch condition the same in the next ad-
dress, which should be taken if the branch condition is false. The technique is il-
lustrated in figure 3.7.
Inverted branches can detect a wrong branch decision, because:
• if thebranch condition shouldbe true, but theprogramdoesnotbranch, the
branch condition in the branch instruction at the next address will be true,
and the programwill proceed with recovery
• if the branch condition should be false, but the program does branch, the
inverted branch condition in the branch instruction at the branch address
will be true, and the programwill proceed with recovery
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assuming that the probability that both two sequential branch instructions are af-
fected by an error is low enough that the duplicated branch instructionwill detect
the error.
Fault injections on sequential and combinational components of a processor
show a fault coverage of:
• 0.77 to 0.84 for EDDI
• 0.04 to 0.09 for signatures for basic blocks
• 0.01 for inverted branches
EDDI can detect most of the injected faults, where the laƦer two techniques
can not. For all techniques combined, the authors state a fault coverage of 0.79
to 0.88.
The authors state that most of the undetected errors are due to unintentional
jumps from a basic block to the same basic block. So, the authors suggest adding
additional fault tolerance, but state that full fault coverage isunlikely tobereached.
The presented software level techniques are very flexible but their fault cov-
erage is probably insufficient for most mission-critical applications. In our ap-
proach, we propose a hardware error detection approach to catch the errors di-
rectly on the bit level and so reach almost full fault coverage. If multiple bit er-
rors are not allowed, our approach leads to full fault coverage (discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.4).
3.3 Cross-layer exploration for architecting resilience
The work [Che+16a] proposes a fault tolerance framework spanning various ab-
straction layers of a system. The framework combines known fault tolerance tech-
niques to find cost-effective, area- and power-efficient combinations.
Compared to the conference publication [Che+16a], the extended eprint ver-
sion [Che+16b] contains details of the parity checking approach, which is impor-
tant as related work and will be discussed separately from the general aspects of
this work.
Firstwediscuss thegeneralaspects, andthenparity checkingused in thiswork.
3.3.1 General discussion
The faultmodel of thework are the single andmultiple bitflips ongeneral purpose
processors due to radiation in terrestrial environments. An in-order and a more
complex out-of-order processor are used in the evaluations. The evaluated tech-
niques include someof the techniques thatwe presented in section 2.4 and in this
chapter, e.g., an improved versionofDICE, parity checkingandEDDI.Where error
correction techniques can be evaluated alone, the error detection techniques are
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analyzed both alone and by combiningwith recoverymechanisms for processors,
e.g., instruction retry.
Theauthors emphasize the importanceof anautomatizedapproach for imple-
menting fault tolerance, as fault tolerance is generally implemented on systems
based on experience and common practice. So, they propose a cross-layer fault
tolerance by combining low- and and high-level techniques and picking the com-
bination that provides the error rate improvement needed by amission.
The framework consists of four components:
• reliabilityanalysisusingbitflip injectionandexecution timeevaluationusing
RTLmodels and benchmark application
• area, power, energy, clock frequency evaluation by physical synthesis and
layout
• a resilience libraryconsistingof tenerrordetectionandcorrection techniques
and four system recovery techniques for general purpose processors
• an evaluation component, which compares the error rate improvements of
different combinations
Compared to the relatedwork presented in 3.1 and 3.2, the authors use amore
detailed classification of erroneous outcomes in the benchmarks:
• silent data corruption (SDC)
• detected but uncorrected error (DUE)
SDC happens if the system cannot detect an error, the system continues process-
ing and the error corrupts the program output. In DUE, the system also cannot
detect the error, but the system crashes and is not usable without human inter-
vention. In context of this work, if the benchmark program terminates normally,
but theprogramoutput datadiffers, this corresponds toanSDC. If thebenchmark
program terminates unexpectedly, does not terminate in two times the nominal
execution time, or if the system recovery is not successful after an error is de-
tected, this is a DUE.
According to the concepts we introduced in section 2.1.1, both SDC and DUE
are failure events from the user perspective, because corrupted program output
and a system crash are likely unwanted events for the user. The severity of these
two failures dependon the service expectation of the user. If the user expects that
the service should run without interruption, then a DUE is a more severe failure.
On the other hand, if an incorrect program output should be avoided, then the
user can favor a DUE instead of an SDC. All in all, a mission-critical system must
not have any failures.
Asa fault tolerancemeasure tocompare theevaluated techniques,mainly SDC
andDUE improvementareused,where improvement is definedby comparing the
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number of erroneous outcomes of the unhardened and hardened design after a
benchmark run:
improvement = number of erroneous outcomes of the unhardened designnumber of erroneous outcomes of the hardened design
The concepts SDC- and DUE-improvement are beƦer measures for compar-
ing the fault tolerance techniques compared to error detection coverage, because
not all flipflop-bitflips on a processor leads to an SDC or DUE. This means an un-
hardeneddesign canhave already an intrinsic error detection coverage, if only the
program output is observed for evaluations. For instance, the authors found out
that about 39% of flipflops in the out-of-order processor design do not lead to an
erroneous outcome during the benchmarks at all.
The flipflops not leading to any erroneous belong to components like branch
prediction or trap register, which do not play a crucial role for the correctness of
the system but performance. In this case, these components can be left unhard-
ened.
The authors advocate the fault model of bitflips in flipflops, as this model is
sufficient enough to reflect the actual behavior of current systems, and test only
for errors at the flipflop level. They additionally mention that injecting faults at
higher levels, e.g., at register or application level, can cause highly inaccurate re-
sults.
For instance, EDDI achieves an SDC improvement factor of about 3 when bit-
flips are injected on the flipflop level, 2 on the register level, and 13 on the appli-
cation level when the bitflips are injected into program variables.
The authors mention dual and triple modular redundancy (DMR, TMR) at the
architecture level, but do not evaluate them due to their high overhead of about
200% and 300% in area and power.
High-level techniques at the software and algorithm level do not provide an
SDC improvement of more than 38 and therefore they propose augmenting low-
level techniques at the circuit and logic level.
The framework found out that a combination of algorithm-based fault toler-
ance, parity, LEAP-DICE and architectural recovery approach can achieve an SDC
improvement factorof 50withabout 1%area, 2%power, and3%energyoverhead
for the in-order processor. So, they conclude that new approaches aim for beƦer
error rate improvements than the particular techniques used in this combination.
3.3.2 Parity checking
The authors use parity checking for flipflops as a circuit-level error detection tech-
nique. Pipelining and flipflop grouping for parity checking is also discussed.
Inparity checking, paritybit is calculated foragroupofflipflops. In theirmethod-
ology, flipflop group size (in ourwork, we call this cluster size) can be 16 or 32 bits,
as the authors experimentally determined that these two group sizes lead to the
lowest resource costs. Parity checking is implemented for a flipflop group size of
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32flipflops. If this technique does notmeet the timing of the original design, then
the group size of 16 along with parity pipelining is used.
The authors do not present any algorithm details about how the pipelining is
implemented on the design. Based on the presented figure in the work, we as-
sume that this is traditional pipelining which can lead to error detection latency.
In our pipelining approach in chapter 5, we use a different approach based on se-
quential distance.
In parity checking, flipflops can be grouped in various ways. The authors eval-
uated the following heuristics for creating the flipflops groups:
• fixed group size
• sorted by vulnerability
• sorted by flipflop locations
• sorted by timing slack
Their evaluations show that grouping theflipflopsby their locations andusing the
former methodology (use group size of 32 flipflops, if timing not met, use group
size of 16 with pipelining) yielded the most area-efficient and power efficient re-
sult with an overhead of 11% and 23%, respectively.
Sorting by locations was done by using the hierarchy in the design. Flipflops
belonging to a processor component, e.g., instruction fetch, were grouped to-
gether. Note that we used the place and route results for grouping the flipflops
in the design.
In technology nodes featuring very small feature sizes, a single particle strike
canalsoaccount formultiplebitflips. Tocopewith this threat, in theirparity check-
ing approach the authors enforce that two flipflops in the same parity group are
not adjacent, and also try tomaximize the average distance between the flipflops
in the same parity group.
Chapter 4
Parity-based error detection
In previous chapters we introduced error detection–based fault tolerance (EDFT).
The error detection block in EDFT simultaneously checks for any bit errors in the
target circuit. For thispurposeaconcurrenterrordetectionapproachcanbeused.
To allow a more precise evaluation of the EDFT, a concrete error detection ap-
proachmust be chosen. We chose parity checking approach for this purpose.
Our evaluation is in this chapter is based on a commercially available FPGA for
mission-critical applications using benchmarks circuits. We also provide an au-
tomatized implementation of parity-based error detection. Even parity checking
is a well-known technique, our work enable a more precise evaluation, and com-
plex comparison of two different fault tolerance approaches - EDFT and LTMR.
In this chapter, we first present the idea behind parity-based error detection
and provide the specification of our implementation in section 4.1. Using this
specification and the reference processing architecture introduced in section 1.1,
wegive ananalytical evaluationofPBED in section4.2 andcomparewith the state
of the art approach LTMR. In section 4.3, we do the comparison using synthesis
results based on various circuits. Finally, section 4.4 presents the automatic ap-
plication of PBED.
4.1 Concept
Parity checking is the most basic error detection technique and it is well-known
[NZ98]. Parity can detect an odd number of bit errors in a data word by adding a
parity bit to the data word so that the number of 1-bits in the word is even (even
parity) or odd (odd parity). Upon reading the data word alongwith the parity bit,
the parity is calculated again, compared to the used parity property (even or odd)
and in case of amismatch, an error signal is asserted. Subsequently, an error han-
dler can react and initiate a recovery scheme to correct the error.
Now, we will describe the implementation details of our parity checking ap-
proach for sequential circuits and we will refer to our implementation as parity-
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based error detection (PBED). A circuit whichmust be hardenedwill be called tar-
get circuit.
In PBED, application flipflops in the target circuit are partitioned into clusters
and for each cluster one parity flipflop is introduced. This problem can be formu-
lated as follows:
• Fa = {fa1 , . . . , f an} is the set of n application flipflops in the target circuit
• Ca = {Ca1 , . . . , Cam} is the set ofm flipflop clusters, which is a partitioning of
Fa, where:
– ⋃Cai∈Ca Cai = Fa
– Cai ∩ Caj = ∅ for i ̸= j
– |Cai | ≤ k
– k is the number of flipflops in a cluster
The partitioning Ca is then altered to include the parity flipflops:
• Fp = {fp1 , . . . , fpm} is the set ofm parity flipflops, where:
• Cp = {Cp1 , Cp2 , . . . , Cpm} is the set ofm flipflop clusters which are hardened
by parity, where
– Cpi = Cai ∪ {fpi }
– fpi = fa1 ⊕ fa2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ faq for even parity
– fpi = fa1 ⊕ fa2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ faq ⊕ 1 for odd parity
– {fa1 , . . . , f aq } = Cai
– ⊕ is the XOR operator
In the following,wealso include theXORgates forparitygenerationandcheck-
ing in theflipflop cluster for convenience. Figure4.1 shows thegeneric implemen-
tation of the error detection in a single cluster clusterED in detail. One cluster con-
sists of k application flipflops FFa, one parity flipflop FFp and two XORs: one for
parity generation and one for parity checking. Note that even the whole block is
namedas clusterED, only theXORs and the FFp belong to the error detectionmod-
ule as visualized in figure 1.5.
Normally, a PBED-hardened circuit contains many clusters. To generate the
error signal for the whole circuit, the cluster signals must be reduced to a single
error signal. The straightforward approach for reducing the cluster error signals
is to OR these signals as shown in figure 4.2. This approachwill be abbreviated as
direct PBED.
Note that there is an extended version of this approach, which reduces the
cluster error signals using a pipelining approach, which will be covered and an-
alyzed independently in the following chapter 5. This chapter is only about the
direct PBED approach, therefore the short abbreviation PBED will only refer to
direct PBED here.
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Figure4.1: Parity-basederror detection in a single cluster. A single error detection
cluster clusterED houses k application flipflops (FFa) and one parity flipflop (FFp).
The (even) parity is calculated by XORing k inputs to the FFas and the data in-
tegrity is checked by XORing k + 1 flipflop output signals in the clusterED. The
error signal errorcl is active in case of an odd number of bit errors.
PI clusterED error
handling PO
circuitPBED,direct
PObare
error
Figure 4.2: PBED-hardened circuit with direct cluster error signal reduction. The
errorcl signals (figure 4.1) are reduced by using a single logical OR gate to the sig-
nal ’error’, which is then input to the error handler. The primary output of the
bare (i.e., unhardened) circuit is also input to the error handling module for iso-
lation of the circuit (refer to section 6.1 for more details).
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4.2 Analytical evaluation
Like most error detection techniques applied on design-level, also PBED intro-
duces redundancy to the circuit and thus affects the circuit area and critical path.
In this section, we will evaluate these circuit impacts analytically and compare
them to LTMR. Moreover, we will analyze the multiple bit error susceptibility of
PBED and LTMR. The goal of this analysis is to get first theoretical limits before
we proceed with the experimental evaluation.
The following subsections are structured as follows: We will first describe the
prerequisites for the analysis. Then, the critical path delay and circuit area over-
head impacts of both approaches will be analyzed and compared. Finally, we will
discuss about themultiple bit susceptibility.
4.2.1 Prerequisites
The circuit analysiswill bedonebyahypothetical synthesis of thePBED-hardened
circuit for the Microsemi flash-based FPGA ProASIC3, i.e., the primitives of the
ProASIC3 will be used as building blocks. In ProASIC3 architecture, every config-
urable logic block (CLB) canbe configuredeither as a three-input LUTor aflipflop.
Microsemi ProASIC3 [Micr15a] is chosen because it is state of the art for space
missions (e.g., [VSC15; Tre+14]) and it is commercially available in a special inte-
grated circuit package for space environment. ProASIC3’s broad availability and
spaceprovenancemakes itmore reasonable todo the synthesison thisFPGAthan
using a customASIC design kit.
Note that in this chapter we confine the evaluation only to the error detection
block to provide an independent analysis of EDFT’s components. Nevertheless,
we assume that the error output of the error detection module is connected to a
flipflop in the error handler to enable a more precise analysis of the critical path
impact.
Many of the following comparison parameters are dependent on:
• the size of one cluster scl, where scl ≥ 2
• the total cluster count in the target circuit ccl.
Consequently, themeasurement parameterswill be determinedonly by using the
flipflop count in the target circuit - the combinatorics will be arbitrary in this anal-
ysis. According to the figure 4.3, scl = k + 1 and ccl = m.
The parameters will be determined for scl != 3x and ccl != 3y, where x, y ∈ N,
which fits into the ProASIC3 architecture with three-input LUTs. This selection of
input parametersmakes themost timing-efficient use of the FPGA area for a spe-
cific logic depth. With the increasing value of scl and ccl more LUTs are needed for
parity generation and the reduction of cluster error signals, respectively. With in-
creasingnumber of LUTsona critical path, longer delay is introducedon this path.
However, the additional delay is only proportional to the logarithm of scl and ccl.
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Figure 4.3: Direct PBED with labeled components for analysis. m = ccl error de-
tection clusters are connected to the error signal reduction gate ORrdc. pg and pc
stand for parity-generation and -check, respectively.
Consequently, the critical path of a benchmark circuit only changes for different
values x, y ∈ N, leading to such selection of scl and ccl values. This behavior is
visualized in figure 4.6.
To differentiate the comparison parameters of circuit with different harden-
ing techniques, the parameters of the bare circuit (i.e., target circuit, hardening
not implemented) are labeled with the subscript bare and the parameters of the
circuits with LTMR and PBED with LTMR and PBED, respectively. An overhead in a
measurement parameter by the applied technique is labeledwith the subscript+.
For the analysis of the critical path delay, interconnect delays are not consid-
ered. The interconnect delays depend significantly on the CLB placing and clock-
ing resource utilization in an FPGA, which makes a general analysis not feasible.
Nevertheless, these analytical values will be compared with experimental values
in section 4.3.
4.2.2 Critical path delay
The critical path delay tcrit limits themaximum frequency of a circuit and increases
with additional serial logic on the critical path. Inwhat follows, wefirst determine
LTMR’s then PBED’s critical path delay, and then compare them.
LTMR
In LTMR, every bit must be decoded by amajority voter (MAJ3) before it is propa-
gated to the combinational logic, which causes an extra delay. Consequently the
actual critical path delay tcrit,bare is extended by the propagation delay of the ma-
jority voter. The subscript pd stands for propagation delay.
tcrit+,LTMR = tpd,MAJ3 (4.1)
Figure 4.4 visualizes the critical path overhead caused by the LTMR.
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Figure 4.4: The critical path overhead of the LTMR visualized. Critical paths of
the bare and LTMR applied circuit are denoted as tcrit,bare and tcrit,LTMR. Note that
even tcrit literally denotes the maximum time duration that a flipflop output sig-
nal requires to reach another flipflop, in this figure, tcrit denotes the path that this
critical flipflop output signal travels.
PBED
In PBED, there are two critical path candidates:
1. the actual critical path plus the overhead added serially by PBED, i.e., the
critical path of the bare circuit plus the parity generation path, tcrit,PBED,1
2. a newly createdparallel path byPBED, the parity check and the cluster error
signal reduction path, tcrit,PBED,2
These two paths are visualized in figure 4.5.
The first path delay can be calculated as follows: The parity has to be gener-
ated before the combinational signals are registered. The propagation delay of
the gate XORpg is called tpd,XORpg .
tcrit+,PBED,1 = tpd,XORpg (4.2)
The second path tcrit,PBED,2 consists of the XORpc and ORrdc.
tcrit,PBED,2 = tpd,XORpc + tpd,ORrdc (4.3)
The gates XORpc, XORpg and ORrdc can have more than three inputs, so they
will be synthesized as a tree of LUTs on the ProASIC3. The synthesis of a gatewith
sinput inputs to a tree with a depth of d is shown in figure 4.6.
The propagation delay generated by a gate with an input size sinput is called
tpd(gate, sinput) and can be calculated by determining the depth d of the tree and
multiplying itwith thepropagationdelayof the respective three-inputmacro (e.g.,
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Figure 4.5: The two critical path candidates in direct PBED, tcrit,PBED,1 and
tcrit,PBED,2. Note that tcrit,PBED,1 is generated by adding the critical path overhead
of PBED tcrit+,PBED,1 to the existing critical path of the target circuit tcrit,bare while
tcrit,PBED,2 is newly generated by PBED.
/
sinput
LUT
LUT LUT
LUT LUT
LUT
LUT
depth 1 … d− 1 d
12...
...
sinput
Figure 4.6: The figure shows how a gate with input size of sinput is mapped to an
FPGA architecturewith three-input LUTs. Aftermapping, a LUT treewith a depth
of d = ⌈log3 sinput⌉ is created. Note that if sinput is not a power of three, then not
all the leafs of the tree exist.
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OR3 for an OR gate), as the interconnect delays are not considered:
tpd(gate, sinput) = dgate · tpd,macro
= ⌈log3 sinput⌉ · tpd,macro
(4.4)
With eq. 4.4, the propagation delays of the three defined gates can be calculated:
tpd,XORpg = ⌈log3(scl − 1)⌉ · tpd,XOR3 (4.5)
tpd,XORpc = ⌈log3 scl⌉ · tpd,XOR3 (4.6)
tpd,ORrdc = ⌈log3 ccl⌉ · tpd,OR3
=
⌈
log3
⌈cFF,bare
scl
⌉⌉
· tpd,OR3
(4.7)
With equations 4.5 to 4.7, we can finally calculate the critical paths for PBED
by only using our input parameter variables scl and cFF,bare.
Thecriticalpathdelays tcrit+,PBED,1 and tcrit,PBED,2 havethe inputparametervari-
ables scl and cFF,bare. The remaining input parameters, i.e., gate propagation de-
lays, are assumed to be constant values. Propagation delay of themacros are de-
pendent on environment factors like the temperature, but we assume a constant
environment inouranalysis. Consequently, only scl and cFF,bare limit themaximum
frequency of the circuit.
In ProASIC3, at a junction temperature of 70◦C andworst-case supply voltage
1.14 V, tpd,MAJ3, and tpd,XOR3 are 1.09ns, and 1.37 ns respectively [Micr15a]. The
propagation delay tpd,OR3 was neither available in the datasheet or macro library
documentation. We assume the value of tpd,OR3 = 0.777ns, which is taken from
the timing report of a layouted netlist which uses the primitive OR3. With these
data the critical path caused by the flipflops and combinational elements can be
calculated for various scl and cFF,bare parameters.
Comparison
Table 4.1 shows the critical path delays tcrit+,1 and tcrit,2 for various values of the in-
put parameter (x, y). The parameters scl and cFF,bare are determined using (x, y),
wherescl = 3x, cluster count ccl = 3y andflipflopcount in thebarecircuitcFF,bare =
(scl − 1) · ccl. With increasing depth of XORpg, tcrit+,1 grows for PBED, i.e., every
time when scl reaches a higher power of 3. The additional path delay tcrit+,1 of
LTMR is independent of the input parameters. For scl = 3 LTMR and PBEDhave a
similar critical pathoverhead. PBEDhas additionally the tcrit+,2, whichgrowswith
increasing depth of XORpc and ORrdc gates.
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tcrit+,1 (ns) tcrit,2 (ns)
(x, y) scl ccl cFF,bare LTMR PBED PBED
(1,2) 3 9 18 1.09 1.37 2.92
(1,3) 3 27 54 1.09 1.37 3.7
(1,4) 3 81 162 1.09 1.37 4.48
(2,2) 9 9 72 1.09 2.74 4.29
(2,3) 9 27 216 1.09 2.74 5.07
(2,4) 9 81 648 1.09 2.74 5.85
(3,2) 27 9 234 1.09 4.11 5.66
(3,3) 27 27 702 1.09 4.11 6.44
(3,4) 27 81 2106 1.09 4.11 7.22
Table 4.1: Critical path impacts of LTMR and PBED for different numbers of appli-
cation flipflops in the circuit and cluster sizes
Compared to the tcrit+,PBED,1, which is always relative to the existing critical
path tcrit,bare, tcrit,PBED,2 is generated in parallel to the bare circuit. Due to this rea-
son, tcrit,PBED,2 stays uncritical up to a certain depth of parity check and reduction
gates.
4.2.3 Circuit area overhead
Assuming that the circuit area is proportional to the CLB count, we define the pa-
rameter Area as the CLB count. For comparison, we are interested in the area
overheadArea+, i.e., the CLB overhead cCLB+:
Area+ = cCLB+ (4.8)
InProASIC3architecture, everyCLBcanbeeither configuredas anflipflopor LUT.
Then, the circuit area overhead can be calculated by adding the count of addition-
ally introduced LUTs and flipflops:
cCLB+ = cLUT+ + cFF+ (4.9)
LTMR
In theLTMRappliedcircuit, theflipflopsare triplicated, i.e., tworedundantflipflops
are added for each application flipflop:
cFF+,LTMR = 2 · cFF,bare (4.10)
LTMR requires one LUT for each application flipflop as voter:
cLUT+,LTMR = cFF,bare (4.11)
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In total, the area overhead for LTMR is:
Area+,LTMR = cCLB+,LTMR = 3 · cFF,bare (4.12)
PBED
In PBED, for each cluster one parity flipflop is needed:
cFF+,PBED = ccl (4.13)
XORpg-, XORpc- and ORrdc-gates consist of LUTs:
cLUT+,PBED = ccl(cLUT,XORpg + cLUT,XORpc) + cLUT,ORrdc (4.14)
As shown in figure 4.6, a gate with sinput inputs creates a tree, so the needed
maximumLUT count for a tree of depth d can be determined by the following for-
mula, assuming that every new level of the tree introduces 3d LUTs at maximum.
A gate with sinput is symbolized as gatesinput in the following.
cLUT,gatesinput ,max =
dgatesinput−1∑
i=0
3i
=
1
2
· (3dgatesinput − 1)
(4.15)
Using the formula for depth d = ⌈log3 sinput⌉ (figure 4.6):
cLUT,gatesinput ,max =
1
2
· (3⌈log3 sinput⌉ − 1) (4.16)
If sinput is a power of 3 (in case of XORpc and ORrdc), then the equation can be
further simplified:
sinput
!
= 3x, x ∈ N =⇒ 3⌈log3 sinput⌉ = sinput
=⇒ cLUT,gatesinput =
1
2
· (sinput − 1)
(4.17)
If sinput + 1 is a power of 3 (in case of XORpg), the same amount of LUTs are
required. This is due to the fact that in one cluster, a gate with sinput inputs in this
case will contain a single two-input LUTwith the rest being three-input LUTs. As-
sumingno logic optimization like logic packing, a two- anda three-input LUTboth
occupy one CLB, thus the same area.
sinput + 1
!
= 3x, x ∈ N =⇒ 3⌈log3 sinput⌉ = sinput + 1
=⇒ cLUT,gatesinput =
1
2
· sinput
(4.18)
The logical gates XORpc and ORrdc have an input size of k + 1 = scl = 3x and
m = ccl = 3y, respectively (cf. subsection 4.2.1 andfigure 4.3) and are assumed to
4.2. ANALYTICAL EVALUATION 55
have an input size which is a power of 3. So, with eq. 4.17, cLUT,XORpc and cLUT,ORrdc
can be determined.
sinput,XORpc = scl =⇒ cLUT,XORpc =
1
2
· (scl − 1) (4.19)
sinput,ORrdc = ccl =⇒ cLUT,ORrdc =
1
2
· (ccl − 1) (4.20)
The logical gate XORpg has as input size of k = scl−1 = 3x−1. Consequently,
sinput + 1 is a power of 3. So, with eq. 4.18, cLUT,XORpg can be determined.
sinput,XORpg = scl − 1 =⇒ cLUT,XORpg =
1
2
· (scl − 1) (4.21)
By using the LUT counts of XORpc, ORrdc and XORpg from the last three equa-
tions, the LUT overhead of PBED in eq. 4.14 can be rewriƦen:
cLUT+,PBED = ccl(cLUT,XORpg + cLUT,XORpc) + cLUT,ORrdc (4.14 revisited)
cLUT+,PBED = ccl
(1
2
· (scl − 1) + 1
2
· (scl − 1)
)
+
1
2
(ccl − 1)
= ccl(scl − 1) + 1
2
(ccl − 1)
(4.22)
Finally, with eq. 4.9, 4.13 and 4.22, total area overhead for PBED equals to:
Area+,PBED = ccl + ccl(scl − 1) + 1
2
(ccl − 1)
= ccl + cclscl − ccl + ccl
2
− 1
2
= ccl(scl +
1
2
)− 0.5
(4.23)
cFF,bare is amain input parameter, therefore it is beƦer to rewrite ccl using cFF,bare:
Area+,PBED =
cFF,bare
scl − 1 (scl +
1
2
)− 0.5 (4.24)
Comparison
Table 4.2 shows the area overhead Area+ and area overhead caused by a single
application flipflop Area+ : cFF,bare for various values of scl and cFF,bare parame-
ters. Area overheadArea+ is related to cFF,bare instead of thewhole circuit includ-
ing combinatorics, because the area overhead is only dependent on cFF,bare and
the combinatorics LUT count is arbitrary.
PBED leads to an area overhead of circa 1.7 LUTs per application flipflop for
scl = 3. TheareaoverheadofPBEDdecreaseswith increasingscl and ccl toapprox-
imately 1.1 LUTs per application flipflop. The LTMR area overhead is independent
of the input parameters. Overall, scl = 3 is a reasonable choice for saving signif-
icant amount of FPGA resources and at the same time for having as liƦle impact
on the critical path as possible. If the maximum frequency is not important, then
higher scl values can be the choice.
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Table 4.2: Area impacts of LTMR and PBED for different numbers of application
flipflops in the circuit and cluster sizes
Area+ Area+ : cFF,bare
(x, y) scl ccl cFF,bare LTMR PBED LTMR PBED
(1,2) 3 9 18 54 31 3 1.72
(1,3) 3 27 54 162 94 3 1.74
(1,4) 3 81 162 486 283 3 1.75
(2,2) 9 9 72 216 85 3 1.18
(2,3) 9 27 216 648 256 3 1.19
(2,4) 9 81 648 1944 769 3 1.19
(3,2) 27 9 234 702 247 3 1.06
(3,3) 27 27 702 2106 742 3 1.06
(3,4) 27 81 2106 6318 2227 3 1.06
4.2.4 Multiple bit error susceptibility
LTMR and PBED techniques both are immune against one bitflip in a clock cycle,
but not against multiple- and even-number of bit errors in one cluster, respec-
tively. In this section, wewill compare the LTMR and PBED regardingmultiple bit
error susceptibility by calculating the probability that an error cannot be detected
in the circuit.
We assume that every flipflop in LTMR and PBED is updated in every clock cy-
cle with a correct value, otherwise the bitflips can accumulate and lead to uncor-
rectable errors.
If a single particle travels through the circuit, then it can cause single ormulti-
plebit errorsdependenton theamountof energy transferred to the circuit and the
size of the IC structures. In this analysis, we assume that the CLBs are far enough
from each other to consider bitflips as independent events and all the flipflops
have the same bitflip probability. In the following, we use p as the bitflip prob-
ability of one flipflop in one clock cycle.
In what follows, we calculate the probability for an undetectable multiple bit
error in a hardened circuit under the former assumptions. The probability for a
multiple bit error is abbreviated as pMBE.
LTMR
We apply the definition of a cluster also on LTMR and define an LTMR cluster as
the group of three flipflops after triplication. So, if two or three bits flip in a cluster
during a clock cycle, then this cluster outputs a wrong value. If i is the number of
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bits flipped in a cluster:
pMBE,cl,LTMR =
3∑
i=2
(
3
i
)
pi(1− p)3−i
= 3p2(1− p) + p3
= 3p2 − 2p3
(4.25)
There is one cluster for each application flipflop. So there are cFF,bare LTMR clus-
ters in total. For an undetectable error, at least one LTMR cluster must have an
undetectable number of bitflips.
pMBE,LTMR =
cFF,bare∑
i=1
(
cFF,bare
i
)
piMBE,cl,LTMR(1− pMBE,cl,LTMR)cFF,bare−i (4.26)
It is easier to calculate the complement of this event, which simplifies the sum.
So, we calculate the probability that LTMR works without any undetected error.
This means all of the LTMR clusters have detectable number of bitflips. Then, we
subtract the complementary event from 1.
pMBE,LTMR = 1−
0∑
i=0
(
cFF,bare
i
)
piMBE,cl,LTMR(1− pMBE,cl,LTMR)cFF,bare−i
= 1− (1− pMBE,cl,LTMR)cFF,bare
= 1− (1− 3p2 + 2p3)cFF,bare
(4.27)
PBED
In a PBED cluster, (positive) even number of bitflips cannot be detected.
pMBE,cl,PBED =
scl∑
i=2,
i=2n,n∈N
(
scl
i
)
pi(1− p)scl−i
=

∑ scl
2
n=1
(
scl
2n
)
p2n(1− p)scl−2n scl = 2j, j ∈ N∑ scl−1
2
n=1
(
scl
2n
)
p2n(1− p)scl−2n
+
∑scl
i=scl
(
scl
i
)
pi(1− p)scl−i scl = 2j + 1, j ∈ N
(4.28)
Analogous to LTMR, for an undetectable error, at least one of ccl PBED clusters
must have an undetectable number of bitflips in one clock cycle. But like in Like in
eq. 4.27, it is easier to calculate the complementary event.
pMBE,PBED =
ccl∑
i=1
(
ccl
i
)
piMBE,cl,PBED(1− pMBE,cl,PBED)ccl−i
= 1−
0∑
i=0
= 1− (1− pMBE,cl,PBED)ccl
(4.29)
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Table 4.3: Comparison of LTMRandPBED regardingmultiple bit error probability
of one cluster pMBE,cl and whole circuit pMBE
pMBE,cl pMBE
(x, y) scl ccl cFF,bare LTMR PBED LTMR PBED
(1,2) 3 9 18 4.84e-36 4.84e-36 8.71e-35 4.35e-35
(1,3) 3 27 54 4.84e-36 4.84e-36 2.61e-34 1.31e-34
(1,4) 3 81 162 4.84e-36 4.84e-36 7.84e-34 3.92e-34
(2,2) 9 9 72 4.84e-36 5.81e-35 3.48e-34 5.23e-34
(2,3) 9 27 216 4.84e-36 5.81e-35 1.05e-33 1.57e-33
(2,4) 9 81 648 4.84e-36 5.81e-35 3.14e-33 4.7e-33
(3,2) 27 9 234 4.84e-36 5.66e-34 1.13e-33 5.1e-33
(3,3) 27 27 702 4.84e-36 5.66e-34 3.4e-33 1.53e-32
(3,4) 27 81 2106 4.84e-36 5.66e-34 1.02e-32 4.59e-32
Comparison
Assuming one year mission in the second Lagrangian point (L2 orbit, 1.5 million
kmaway from the earth), under 1/cm² shielding, a programmed circuit with 5000
flipflops on an RTPE3000L FPGA has four SEUs [BSV11, ch. 7]. If this circuit runs
at 20MHz, then p can be calculated by:
p = 4/5000/365/24/60/60/(20× 106)
≈ 1.27× 10−18 (4.30)
Table 4.3 shows a comparison of multiple bit error probabilities for various scl
cFF,bare parameters. Themultiple bit error probability of one cluster pMBE,cl should
be lower for the PBED, as PBED can detect an odd number of bit errors. The cal-
culation does not show any differences for pMBE,cl, because the assumed bit error
rate p is very low and multiple bit errors greater than two practically do not hap-
pen.
For scl = 3, pMBE ofPBED isapproximatelyhalf of theLTMR’s. When thecluster
size scl for PBED increases, then pMBE of PBED also increases - at scl = 27, pMBE of
PBED is approximately five times of LTMR’s.
4.3 Experimental evaluation
After the analytical evaluation, we provide experimental results, which allows a
more precise evaluation of PBED. For experiments, we used:
• an FSM design, which was replicated various times to analyze the impact of
PBED on circuit-timing and -area for various input circuit areas in detail but
with a fixed circuit type.
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• I99T benchmark circuits, which allows to assess the PBED impacts on vari-
ous circuit types.
The temperature and supply voltage seƦings for the timing analysis of the lay-
outed circuits are the same as in the analytical evaluation (junction temperature
of 70◦C andworst-case supply voltage 1.14 V).
The evaluations are also based on the comparison with LTMR like in the ana-
lytical comparison.
LTMR and PBED were applied using the synthesis tool Synplify and a newly-
implemented toolwhichgenerates thePBEDcircuitry on topof anRTLdesign (in-
troduced in section4.4), respectively. This tool and thus the experiments havepa-
rameters like cluster size range, placer try count and partitioning try count. These
parameters along with the tool will be introduced in section 4.4. In what follows,
we only give brief description of these parameters.
ThecircuitsweresynthesizedusingSynplifywithautomatic constraining,which
maps the design with different clock constraints to achieve the highest clock fre-
quency possible. The output netlists were then layouted (in other words placed
and routed) using Designer from Microsemi. Every synthesized circuit were lay-
outed ten times with different seeds (i.e., placing try count = 10) and the layout
with the best timing was picked for the results.
For PBED, we varied the cluster size from 2 to 9 and partitioned the flipflops
according to their location in the layoutedbare circuit. The partitioning technique
does not always find the optimal solution. Therefore the partitioning is repeated
partitioning try count times and the best solutionwas chosen. In all experiments
we used partitioning try count = 100. The partitioning uses layout data (coordi-
nates of the cell placements) of the layouted bare circuit netlist, for this purpose
the layout data of the bare circuit with the best timing out of the four placed de-
signs were used.
4.3.1 Finite statemachine (FSM) circuit
In this subsection, we present synthesis results using an implementation of the
FSM circuit shown in the reference processing architecture (figure 1.3). To get
various circuit sizes, we instantiated this FSMmultiple times. To not exhaust the
input-output ports of the FPGA due to excessive number of instantiations, which
would make the circuit unplaceable on the FPGA, we connected the circuit out-
puts to a demultiplexer.
Thecircuitsweresynthesized for theProASIC3with thesmallestavailablearea,
the A3P250. We chose an area-constrained FPGA to compare the performance
LTMR and PBED additionally at a high utilization of the FPGA.
The following synthesis results show the circuit input parameters:
• circuitname (circ.),whichcorresponds to theFSMcircuit instantiationcount
• PBED cluster size (scl) for PBED-hardened circuits
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and the circuit output parameters for the bare, LTMR applied and PBED applied
circuits after synthesis:
• flipflop count cFF
• total areaA
• critical path delay tcrit
The parameters are for the bare (ba), LTMR applied (LT) and PBED applied (PB)
circuit. Using the output parameters, we derived the following comparison pa-
rameters:
• theoverheads causedby thehardening techniqueson the respective output
parameters of the bare circuit, which are marked by the plus symbol in the
subscript (+), e.g.,A+,PBED = APB −Aba
• areaoverheadof the respectivehardening techniqueperapplicationflipflop
A+
cFF,ba
• area overhead ratio PBED to LTMR A+,PBA+,LT
We did not normalize the area overhead using the whole area, because both
LTMR and PBED harden directly the flipflops of the circuit. So, area overhead is
mainly dependent on the number of flipflops.
Note that in ProASIC3 architecture, every CLB can be either configured as a
flipflop or lookup table (LUT). Consequently, in thiswork, circuit areaA is defined
as the total count of flipflops and LUTs in the synthesized circuit.
We first do our evaluation by fixing the cluster size at 3. Table 4.4 shows an
excerpt of the obtained parameters from the synthesis results and the table 4.5
shows the derived parameters.
Firstly, we analyze the table 4.4. The FSMhas 25 flipflops, which was instanti-
ated up to 43 times, until the bare circuit could not be fit into the FPGA. In circuits
where the FSMwas replicated, one of the 25 FFs is always synthesized away in the
replica FSMs, because the synthesizer bound a particular primary output net of all
the replicas having always the same value to the sameflipflop. The FSMs have the
same input and are connected to a demultiplexer. Consequently, the circuit with
a single instantiated FSM has 25 flipflops, and with with every instantiated FSM
25− 1 = 24 additional flipflops are added to the circuit. This rule does not always
apply, because as the design gets bigger, some cells may have to drive a higher
amount of other cells, which are called high fanout cells. If the synthesizer en-
counters a sequential or combinational cell with a high fanout, then this cell gets
replicated to divide the fanout on two cells. The replication is needed because a
cell outputhasamaximumcurrent it candrive, hencea limited fanout. Thecircuits
where a flipflop replication happens are for instance 12 and 25, in these cases 25
additional flipflops are added compared to the last circuit.
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Table 4.4: Synthesis results formultiple instantiations of the FSM circuit. The crit-
ical path for LTMR (LT), PBED (PB) and bare (ba) do not exist for circuits > 26,
> 30, and> 42, respectively, because the place-and-router could not route or fit
these circuits into the FPGA due to excessive circuit area. For these circuits, the
critical path delays (tcrit) are marked with minus (-). Flipflop count and area for
PBED-hardened circuit 43 do not exist, as the PBED tool requires a placed and
routed bare circuit, but bare version of circuit 43 cannot be placed and routed.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
circ. ba LT PB ba LT PB ba LT PB
1 25 75 40 144 218 190 7.96 9.61 9.51
2 49 147 76 299 444 388 8.54 10.26 9.72
3 73 219 111 406 670 585 8.40 10.32 10.05
4 97 291 147 546 891 783 8.40 10.35 10.44
5 121 363 183 674 1107 971 8.46 10.45 10.52
6 145 435 219 831 1361 1186 8.43 10.52 10.84
7 169 507 255 975 1586 1387 8.47 10.43 10.67
8 193 579 291 1070 1772 1545 8.39 10.81 11.06
9 217 651 327 1198 1993 1730 8.54 10.86 11.37
10 241 723 363 1328 2202 1920 8.13 10.59 11.59
11 265 795 399 1494 2442 2145 8.66 10.73 11.64
12 290 867 436 1659 2725 2367 8.70 10.78 11.87
13 314 939 472 1833 2978 2600 8.69 10.99 11.98
14 338 1011 508 1967 3172 2796 8.65 10.66 11.96
15 362 1083 544 2101 3411 2988 8.50 10.88 12.37
16 386 1155 580 2315 3701 3262 8.71 11.04 12.53
17 410 1227 616 2383 3857 3387 8.64 11.09 12.47
18 434 1299 652 2547 4092 3609 8.12 10.76 13.04
19 458 1371 688 2638 4316 3758 8.41 10.83 12.54
20 482 1443 724 2786 4566 3969 8.38 10.88 12.95
21 506 1515 760 2923 4787 4163 8.75 11.21 13.02
22 530 1587 796 3089 5035 4392 8.38 11.09 12.94
23 554 1659 832 3248 5266 4613 8.66 10.99 13.46
24 578 1731 870 3420 5495 4841 8.73 11.28 13.27
25 603 1803 906 3542 5753 5020 8.73 11.09 13.51
26 627 1875 942 3712 5987 5248 8.74 11.35 14.12
27 651 1947 978 3872 6223 5470 8.89 - 13.65
...
30 723 2163 1086 4282 6881 6060 8.93 - 14.00
31 747 2235 1122 4399 7137 6236 9.02 - -
...
42 1012 3027 1519 6092 9722 8569 8.88 - -
43 1036 3099 - 6287 9952 - - - -
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Table 4.5: Derived parameters for the FSM circuit using the synthesis results in
the table 4.4. The last row shows the average (avg.) value of the last five derived
parameters.
cFF+ A+ tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
circ. LT PB LT PB LT PB LT PB A+,PBA+,LT
1 50 15 74 46 1.65 1.54 2.96 1.84 0.62
2 98 27 145 89 1.71 1.18 2.96 1.82 0.61
3 146 38 264 179 1.92 1.65 3.62 2.45 0.68
4 194 50 345 237 1.96 2.04 3.56 2.44 0.69
5 242 62 433 297 1.98 2.05 3.58 2.45 0.69
6 290 74 530 355 2.09 2.42 3.66 2.45 0.67
7 338 86 611 412 1.96 2.20 3.62 2.44 0.67
8 386 98 702 475 2.41 2.67 3.64 2.46 0.68
9 434 110 795 532 2.32 2.83 3.66 2.45 0.67
10 482 122 874 592 2.46 3.46 3.63 2.46 0.68
11 530 134 948 651 2.07 2.98 3.58 2.46 0.69
12 577 146 1066 708 2.09 3.17 3.68 2.44 0.66
13 625 158 1145 767 2.31 3.29 3.65 2.44 0.67
14 673 170 1205 829 2.01 3.31 3.57 2.45 0.69
15 721 182 1310 887 2.39 3.87 3.62 2.45 0.68
16 769 194 1386 947 2.32 3.82 3.59 2.45 0.68
17 817 206 1474 1004 2.45 3.84 3.60 2.45 0.68
18 865 218 1545 1062 2.64 4.92 3.56 2.45 0.69
19 913 230 1678 1120 2.42 4.13 3.66 2.45 0.67
20 961 242 1780 1183 2.50 4.57 3.69 2.45 0.66
21 1009 254 1864 1240 2.46 4.27 3.68 2.45 0.67
22 1057 266 1946 1303 2.71 4.56 3.67 2.46 0.67
23 1105 278 2018 1365 2.33 4.80 3.64 2.46 0.68
24 1153 292 2075 1421 2.54 4.53 3.59 2.46 0.68
25 1200 303 2211 1478 2.35 4.78 3.67 2.45 0.67
26 1248 315 2275 1536 2.61 5.38 3.63 2.45 0.68
27 1296 327 2351 1598 - 4.76 3.61 2.45 0.68
...
30 1440 363 2599 1778 - 5.07 3.59 2.46 0.68
31 1488 375 2738 1837 - - 3.67 2.46 0.67
...
42 2015 507 3630 2477 - - 3.59 2.45 0.68
43 2063 - 3665 - - - 3.54 - -
avg. 3.59 2.42 0.67
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Compared to the fixed additional number of flipflops after an additional in-
stantiation of the FSM, a repeating paƦern in the additional number of combina-
tional cells cannot be recognized. This is probably due to the heuristics used in
optimizations on combinational cells (LUTs).
The place-and-router could fit 26 LTMR-hardened, 30PBED-hardened and 42
not-hardened (bare) FSMs into the FPGA.
Now, we look at the derived values. The derived values include the overheads
in area (cFF+,A+) and critical path (tcrit+), aswell as thenormalized areaoverhead
( A+cFF,ba ) and the area overhead ratio between PBED and LTMR (
A+,PB
A+,LT
) for compari-
son.
In average, LTMRcauses an area overheadper applicationflipflopof 3.59, and
PBED 2.42. The area overhead ratio is 0.67, so PBED saves 33% of the area over-
head caused by LTMR.
Comparison of the average area overhead values with the analytical results
in table 4.2 shows that the experimental values differ. The difference is about
3.59− 3 = 0.59 in case of LTMR and 2.42− 1.75 = 0.67. This difference is caused
by the remapping of enable flipflops to pairs of a multiplexer and a flipflop. This
remapping ensures that the flipflop is updated in every clock cycle, which in turn
avoids the accumulationof bitflips inPBEDor LTMRcluster. In section4.4, enable
flipflop conversion is discussedmore in detail.
The area overheads of the circuits 1 and 2 stand out. These two circuits have
significantly lower area overheadper flipflop thanother circuits, for instance 2.96
for LTMR. The reason is again the enable flipflop conversion, but in this case the
conversion happened during the synthesis of the bare circuit.
In ProASIC3 architecture, the CLBs can be either configured as a three-input
LUT or flipflop. An enable flipflop with a clear/preset input requires a four inputs
(clock, clear/preset, data input, and data enable), and in this case the clear/preset
input must be connected to a global routing path. Most sequential circuits have
a reset input net, which is connected to most flipflops in the circuit, so normally
apart from the clock signals also the reset signals with high fanout are routed us-
ing global routing paths in ProASIC3, and this is not a significant restriction in de-
signs with common clear/preset inputs for the flipflops. If the clear/preset input
of an enable flipflop is not connected to a net with a high fanout (dependent on
the seƦings) by the synthesizer, then this enable flipflop is converted to a multi-
plexer, and three-input flipflop (with clock, clear/preset, and data input) by the
layout tool. This conversion is analogous to the enable flipflop conversion men-
tioned earlier. In the opposite case, if a net has a high fanout, then the layout
tool promotes this net to a global resource and the net is routed using the limited
global routing resources.
In circuits 1 and 2, all the enable flipflops (15 and 30, respectively) are con-
verted to three-input flipflop andmultiplexer pairs already during the synthesis of
thebare circuit, because thenet connected to theclear/preset inputsof theenable
flipflops does not have enough fanout to be promoted to a global resource. This
64 CHAPTER 4. PARITY-BASED ERRORDETECTION
in turn increased the area of the bare circuit and decreased the area overhead per
application flipflop to values similar to the achieved in the analytical results in ta-
ble4.2 (3 forLTMR,1.7 forPBED),2.96and1.84 in caseof circuit 1and2.96and1.82
in circuit 2. The empirical values for PBED are higher than the analytical results,
becausewe assumed an optimal utilization of the CLBs in the analysis. Beginning
from circuit 3, the required fanout by the synthesizer is achieved by the clear/pre-
set net and the clear/preset net uses a global route on the FPGA. So, the enable
flipflops do not have to be converted, require only one tile, and the enable flipflop
conversion only occurs during the hardening by LTMR and PBED.
Although it is possible to avoid the conversion of enable flipflops also in bare
versions of the circuits 1 and 2 by promoting the reset/preset nets manually to
global resources, we chose an approach where we tried to work with asmuch de-
fault seƦings in the synthesis and layout tools as possible.
In conclusion, the area overhead of PBED and LTMR is highly dependent on
the use of enable flipflops in the circuit. The obtained analytical results regarding
the area overhead can only be achieved in a circuit without enable flipflops.
Thecriticalpathoverhead forPBEDin thesynthesis results is forcircuit 1nearly
the same as in the analytical evaluation (see table 4.1), tcrit+,1,analytical = 1.37ns ≈
1.54ns = tcrit+,experimental. With increasing circuit size the critical path overhead
increases, which can be beƦer seen in figure 4.7 with absolute values and in fig-
ure 4.8 with overhead values.
By looking into the critical path details in the timing reports of the layouted
circuits, we observed that in PBED-hardened versions of circuits 1 to 4 and 6, the
critical path is causedby theparity generation (tcrit+,1, figure4.5) and in the rest of
the circuits, the path caused by theOR-tree (tcrit,2, figure 4.5) becomes the critical
path.
In PBED-hardened circuits, the growth of the critical path overhead decreases
with the circuit size, and the graph has a logarithmic shape. The reason is that the
circuit size is linearly proportional to the flipflop count, but the critical path of the
OR-tree increases logarithmically (see equation 4.7).
The critical path overhead of most of the LTMR-hardened circuits stays be-
tween 1.5 ns and 3 ns. LTMR needs only local routing, therefore the timing over-
head is fairly constant.
The former analytical timing results in table 4.1 differ significantly from the
experimental results of most circuits, because we did not incorporate the rout-
ing delays in our analytical evaluation. For instance, circuit 7 with 169 application
flipflops has tcrit,2 = 4.48ns + 0.777ns = 5.257 (because 162 < 169 < 486 ac-
cording to the analytical results in table 4.1, and tcrit,2(x, y + 1) = tcrit,2(x, y) +
tpd,OR3). The critical path in the experimental results is 10.67 ns, so the routing
makes about half of the whole critical path. In case of LTMR-hardened circuits,
the ratio is similar: 1.09 ns without routing versus 1.5 to 3 ns with routing.
The increasing area hasminimal impact on the critical path of the bare circuit.
This is due to the low complexity of the FSM circuit and their isolation from each
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Figure 4.7: Critical path delay data for the FSMcircuits ploƦed from table 4.4. The
x-axis shows the area of the bare circuit (Abare) in number of FPGA CLBs. The y-
axis shows the absolute critical path delay (tcrit) of the bare and hardened circuits
in the plot in ns. Every point represents a successfully routed circuit and points
belonging to the PBED-, LTMR-hardened or bare circuits are connected by a line,
respectively. Beginning fromAbare ≥ 3872CLBs, thepoints donot exist for LTMR-
hardened circuits, as these could not be fit into the FPGA.
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Figure 4.8: Critical path delay overhead data for the FSM circuits ploƦed from ta-
ble 4.5. The x-axis shows the area of the bare circuit (Abare) in number of FPGA
CLBs. The y-axis shows the critical pathoverheads (tcrit+) of theLTMR-andPBED-
hardened circuits relative to the critical path of the bare circuit in ns. The rest is
similar to figure 4.7.
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other, which does not need long routing paths.
A longer critical path leads to a negative maximum frequency impact on the
circuit, thereforePBED-hardenedcircuit canachievea lower frequency thanLTMR
if thecircuit thathas tobehardened includesmore than975CLBsand169flipflops
(circuit 7 in table 4.4).
Until now, the evaluation was for a fixed cluster size of 3. Now, we present
results with cluster sizes from 2 to 9 to analyze the impact of the cluster size on
the critical path and area overhead. The figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the area
and critical path overheads for all circuits, respectively.
For small circuits (e.g., circuits 1 to 6, up to 145 application flipflops), increas-
ing the cluster size also increases the critical path overhead, because in small cir-
cuits the parity generation is on the critical path, and the parity generation path
grows logarithmically for greater cluster sizes (see equation 4.5).
For other circuits, the critical path overhead stays similar for different cluster
sizes, but a decrease is noticeable in the critical path overhead of most circuits,
if the cluster size of 3 is chosen instead of 2. All in all, the critical path overhead
variation over cluster size stays under 1 ns for circuits 8 to 30 (approximatelymore
than 200 application flipflops, and 1000 CLBs according to table 4.4).
If we look at the area overhead ratio of PBEDandLTMR,we see that the graph
shape is similar for all of the circuits. The circuits 1 and 2 have less overhead, be-
cause theenableflipflopswere already converted in thebare versionof the circuit,
as discussed at the beginning of this section.
The decay in the graphs continues until the cluster size of 6, at which there is
a local maximum. So, the cluster size of 6 should be avoided. For relatively big
circuits (from circuit 8 upwards), cluster size of 9 can be selected without any sig-
nificant compromise on the critical path overhead and thus on themaximum fre-
quency.
Finally, table 4.6 summarizes the minimum and maximum values for the de-
rived values. The upper bound for the critical path overhead stays between 5 to
6ns and the lower bound for the same parameter increases slightly up to 2.44 ns.
The upper and lower bound are caused by the biggest and smallest circuits, re-
spectively. We observe that greater cluster size does only affect relatively small
circuits.
At thehighest experimented cluster sizeof9, PBEDcanachieveandareaover-
head of 1.33, and can save up to 55% of the area overhead caused by the LTMR.
4.3.2 I99T circuits
We applied LTMR and PBED also on the I99T benchmark circuits, which are part
of the ITC’99 benchmark circuits distributed by the CAD group at Politecnico di
Torino. The circuits are introduced in [CRS00] and their VHDL descriptions can
be obtained from [CADP16]. These RT-level circuits have only one clock signal, do
not have any internal memories other than flipflops and are synchronous.
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Figure 4.9: Critical path overhead delay (tcrit+) for PBED hardened FSM circuits
with cluster sizes (scl) varying from 2 to 9. A single PBED cluster corresponds to a
groupofoneparitybit andscl−1applicationflipflops. Thecritical pathoverhead is
relative to the bare circuit. Every point corresponds to a placed and routed circuit.
The lines connect tcrit+,PB values for a particular circuit. The point for the circuit
22(scl = 2) does not exist, because it could not be fit into the FPGA.
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Figure 4.10: Area overhead (A+) per application flipflop ( A+cFF,ba ) for PBED hard-
ened FSM circuits with cluster sizes varying from 2 to 9. Every point corresponds
to a placed and routed circuit. The lines connect y-axis values for a particular cir-
cuit.
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Table 4.6: Minimumandmaximumvalues for derived parameters for PBEDhard-
ened FSM circuits for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 0.22 - 5.55 2.33 - 2.98 0.79 - 0.84
3 1.18 - 5.50 1.82 - 2.46 0.61 - 0.69
4 1.40 - 5.62 1.53 - 2.18 0.52 - 0.61
5 1.54 - 5.55 1.43 - 2.07 0.48 - 0.58
6 1.77 - 5.63 1.45 - 2.08 0.49 - 0.58
7 2.11 - 5.42 1.39 - 2.03 0.47 - 0.57
8 2.44 - 5.60 1.31 - 1.97 0.44 - 0.55
9 2.44 - 5.66 1.35 - 1.96 0.46 - 0.55
In the benchmark package (itc99-poli2-vhd.tar.xz, version 7 Sept. 2014), addi-
tional circuits are available, which are b14_1, b15_1, b17_1, b18_1, b19_1, b20_1,
b21_1, b22_1 and b30. These circuits are not included in our evaluation, because
all from this list but the b30 are minor modified versions of the original circuits,
and b30 was not a compilable circuit description. Moreover, the parametric cir-
cuit b16 was not available in the package, even it is documented in [CRS00].
Synthesis of the circuits were carried out the same way as in subsection 4.3.1,
but this time we used the ProASIC3 FPGA with the highest area resources, the
A3PE3000L. Table 4.7 shows the synthesis results for PBED cluster size of 3 and
the table 4.8 shows the derived parameters.
Of all benchmark circuits only the hardened b19 cannot be layouted on the
used FPGA for both LTMR, and PBED for cluster sizes lower than 4, so b19 does
not have any timing data on tables 4.7 and 4.8.
Circuitswitha lownumberofflipflopshaveanoverheadperapplicationflipflop
ofabout3 incaseofLTMRand less than2 incaseofPBEDdue to theenableflipflop
conversion already done in the bare circuit, whichwediscussed in last subsection.
In the rest of the circuits, the area overhead per application flipflop shown in ta-
ble 4.8 goes up to 3.82 in case of the circuit b14 for LTMR, and 2.68 in case the
circuit b04 for PBED.
The area overhead value of 3.82 shows that LTMR theoretically can have an
area overhead per application flipflop of 4, if the bare circuit flipflops are only en-
able flipflops. The reason is as follows. An additional multiplexer for the enable
flipflop conversion is needed for every application flipflop, so the area overhead
is 3+ 1 = 4. The same rule also applies to PBED, and the analytical results for the
area overhead per application flipflop for PBED in table 4.2 can increase by 1.
As this additional overhead is needed by both of the hardening techniques, it
is beƦer to look at the area overhead ratio PBED to LTMR over the bare circuit
flipflop count, which is shown in figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11 shows that for bare circuits with more than 60 flipflops, the area
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Table 4.7: Synthesis results for I99T benchmark circuits. The results are ordered
by the bare circuit area. See subsection 4.3.1 for the description of the parameters
and abbreviations used in the table.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
cir. ba LT PB ba LT PB ba LT PB
b02 4 12 8 14 26 23 4.59 6.24 5.14
b01 10 30 17 27 58 47 4.46 6.18 5.83
b06 8 24 13 32 56 47 5.50 7.20 6.67
b08 21 63 33 91 153 130 10.49 12.26 11.86
b03 31 90 48 97 185 155 8.20 10.22 9.13
b09 28 84 43 100 182 152 9.66 11.43 10.70
b10 24 72 38 103 175 149 6.75 8.56 7.86
b13 56 168 85 152 333 274 8.14 9.89 9.07
b07 44 132 67 178 308 259 13.57 15.65 14.84
b11 35 105 54 256 359 319 17.12 18.62 18.16
b04 66 198 100 338 589 515 23.81 25.70 25.71
b05 41 108 64 395 490 468 24.59 26.48 25.64
b12 122 357 184 551 1005 878 16.30 17.89 16.84
b14 216 645 325 3484 4310 4060 47.47 51.49 50.14
b15 437 1278 659 4501 5999 5545 33.70 36.09 35.22
b20 435 1290 655 7649 9281 8806 45.70 49.56 49.31
b21 432 1290 650 7771 9419 8925 44.56 48.79 48.63
b22 622 1839 937 11177 13496 12826 45.20 49.35 49.11
b17 1390 4026 2093 13493 18286 16868 34.23 37.02 36.01
b18 3219 9207 4867 34576 45473 42493 46.69 49.11 49.45
b19 6384 18417 9644 61165 83037 76869 49.59 - -
10 100 1,000
0.63
0.65
0.68
0.7
0.73
0.75
bare circuit flipflop count (cFF)
A+,PB
A+,LT
Figure 4.11: Area overhead ratio PBED (scl = 3) to LTMR for all I99T circuits plot-
ted over the flipflop count in the bare circuit. The x-axis is drawn in logarithmic
scale.
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Table 4.8: Derived parameters using the I99T synthesis results in the table 4.4.
The last row shows the average (avg.) value of the last three derived parameters.
cFF+ A+ tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
cir. LT PB LT PB LT PB LT PB A+,PBA+,LT
b02 8 4 12 9 1.65 0.55 3.00 2.25 0.75
b01 20 7 31 20 1.72 1.38 3.10 2.00 0.65
b06 16 5 24 15 1.69 1.17 3.00 1.88 0.63
b08 42 12 62 39 1.77 1.36 2.95 1.86 0.63
b03 59 17 88 58 2.02 0.92 2.84 1.87 0.66
b09 56 15 82 52 1.77 1.04 2.93 1.86 0.63
b10 48 14 72 46 1.81 1.11 3.00 1.92 0.64
b13 112 29 181 122 1.76 0.93 3.23 2.18 0.67
b07 88 23 130 81 2.08 1.27 2.95 1.84 0.62
b11 70 19 103 63 1.50 1.04 2.94 1.80 0.61
b04 132 34 251 177 1.89 1.91 3.80 2.68 0.71
b05 67 23 95 73 1.90 1.05 2.32 1.78 0.77
b12 235 62 454 327 1.60 0.54 3.72 2.68 0.72
b14 429 109 826 576 4.02 2.67 3.82 2.67 0.70
b15 841 222 1498 1044 2.39 1.52 3.43 2.39 0.70
b20 855 220 1632 1157 3.86 3.62 3.75 2.66 0.71
b21 858 218 1648 1154 4.23 4.07 3.81 2.67 0.70
b22 1217 315 2319 1649 4.16 3.91 3.73 2.65 0.71
b17 2636 703 4793 3375 2.80 1.78 3.45 2.43 0.70
b18 5988 1648 10897 7917 2.42 2.75 3.39 2.46 0.73
b19 12033 3260 21872 15704 - - 3.43 2.46 0.72
avg. 3.27 2.24 0.68
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Figure 4.12: Critical path overhead delay (tcrit+) for every I99T circuit and harden-
ing type, sortedaccording tobare circuit area. Plot template sameas infigure4.8,
but the x-axis is drawn in logarithmic scale.
overhead ratio is between 0.7 and 0.73. The rest of the circuits have an area over-
head ratio between 0.6 and 0.65 with the exception of two circuits, the b05 and
b02. b05 and b02make up the two peaks in figure 4.11.
The circuit b05 has an area overhead for LTMR of 2.32, which is extraordinary
low for LTMR. As this circuit has a bare circuit flipflop count of 41, the LTMR area
overhead should be near 3. The reason for the extraordinary low area overhead
is that five flipflops have to be replicated during synthesis of the bare circuit, be-
cause they have a high fanout. LTMR triplicates the flipflops and connects their
outputs to amajority voter, so during synthesis of the LTMR-hardened circuit, in-
stead of flipflops, majority voters get replicated. Therefore, the LTMR-hardened
b05 has (41 − 5) × 3 = 108 flipflops. The extraordinary low area overhead for
LTMR results in a high area overhead ratio of 0.77, which is one of the peaks in
figure 4.11.
Thebareversionof thecircuitb02hasa lowflipflopcountof four, threeof them
have clear inputs and one has preset input. As PBED only adds flipflops with the
same clear/preset signal to a cluster (see section 4.4), three clusters are created
in this case, which in turn creates three parity flipflopswith parity-generation and
-check circuitry. With the additional flipflop for the error output, PBED causes the
highoverheadof 2.25andareaoverhead ratioof0.75,whichmakesup the second
exceptional peak in figure 4.11. For circuits with a low flipflop number but many
not fully-utilized clusters, PBED results in a high area overhead.
Now, we look at the critical path. Figure 4.12 shows the critical path overhead
delay for PBED is in all circuits but in b18 lower than LTMR. In critical path details
we observed that in all off the I99T circuits the parity generation path causes the
critical path and not the error signal reduction path. This is the reason why tcrit+
for PBED in figure 4.12 does not increase with increasing circuit area like in the
synthesis results of the replicated FSMs in figure 4.8.
Until now, the evaluation was for a fixed cluster size of 3. Now, we present
results with cluster sizes from 2 to 9 to analyze the impact of the cluster size on
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Table 4.9: Minimumandmaximumvalues for derived parameters for PBEDhard-
ened I99T circuits for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 -0.34 - 1.93 2.31 - 3.19 0.77 - 1.00
3 0.54 - 4.07 1.78 - 2.68 0.61 - 0.77
4 0.56 - 5.06 1.50 - 2.39 0.50 - 0.65
5 0.85 - 5.49 1.41 - 2.30 0.48 - 0.62
6 1.08 - 5.61 1.37 - 2.36 0.47 - 0.62
7 1.25 - 6.49 1.36 - 2.24 0.46 - 0.62
8 0.93 - 7.13 1.24 - 2.26 0.42 - 0.61
9 0.86 - 6.91 1.27 - 2.23 0.43 - 0.59
the critical path and area overhead. The figures 4.13 and 4.14 illustrate the critical
path- and area-overheads for all circuits, respectively.
As the critical path of all the circuits is caused by the parity generation path,
the critical path increases inmost circuits with increasing cluster size. The reason
is that more inputs to the XOR gate for parity generation creates more routing
delay andmore CLBs.
Compared to the critical path overheads in the FSM circuits, the cluster size
has a noticeable effect on the critical path overhead. This is probably due to the
regularity of the FSM circuits, as theywere created by simple replication of a base
circuit. Most of the I99T circuits are standalone circuits, and this makes the rout-
ing of the clusters more difficult. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between the
critical path overhead of the circuit and the area overhead.
The formof the area overhead ratio plot is similar formost of the circuits, with
the exception of b02 and b05. The decay is visible until cluster size 5. At 6 a lo-
cal peak is present, followed by a slow decay. The plots of the bigger circuits, the
two boƦom plots in figure 4.14, are positively shifted in y-axis compared to the
smaller circuits. This shows that the PBED has more area overhead in bigger cir-
cuits compared to LTMR. For example, the circuits in the second plot, b09 to b11,
have an area overhead ratio between 0.5 and 0.6, where the circuits in the third
and fourth plots, b04 to b18, have an area overhead ratio of 0.6.
Finally, table 4.9 summarizes the minimum and maximum values for the de-
rived values. The upper bound for the critical path overhead is caused by the b19,
which could not be layouted for the cluster sizes 2 and 3, so the upper bound for
the cluster sizes 2 and 3 differ from the rest.
According to the table 4.9, PBED can save up to 58% of the LTMR area over-
head. The upper bound for the area overheads is caused by the circuit b05, there-
fore they differ significantly to the upper bounds in the FSM circuits.
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Figure 4.13: Critical path overhead delay (tcrit+) for PBED hardened I99T circuits
with cluster sizes (scl). Plot template sameasfigure4.9. Thepoints for the circuits
b19 do not exist, because these could not be placed and routed.
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Figure 4.14: Area overhead (A+) per application flipflop ( A+cFF,ba ) for PBED hard-
ened I99T circuits with cluster sizes varying from 2 to 9. Plot template same as
figure 4.10.
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4.4 Automatic application
PBED can be applied on-top of a technology-level netlist using an automatic tool.
The tool is for Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA primitives and is available at [Ayd16].
Thepseudocodeof thedirectPBEDapplicationprogramisshown inalgorithm4.1.
Data: technology-level netlist, placing try count, cluster size, partitioning
try count
Result: direct PBED applied technology-level netlist
1 for t = 1 to placing try count do
2 placer seed = t;
3 place the netlist using the placer tool in Designer;
4 route the placed netlist using the router tool in Designer;
5 end
6 pick the routed netlist with the shortest critical path;
7 extract flipflop coordinates from the picked routed netlist;
8 foreach flipflop do
9 if has enable input then
10 eliminate enable input;
11 end
12 if has negated output then
13 eliminate negated output;
14 end
15 categorize according to clock- and reset-signal;
16 end
Algorithm 4.1:Application of direct PBED to a technology-level netlist p.1
We used various third-party tools for our tool. For the technology-level netlist
processing, thecircuitdescriptionneeds tobeparsedandanewcircuitdescription
must be generated. WeusedVerilog-Perl [Sny16] for this purpose. The place-and-
router tool Designer fromMicrosemi can output two-dimensional coordinates of
the primitives after a place-and-route run. We used this information for partition-
ing. We explain the algorithmmore in detail in what follows.
A proper partitioning of the flipflops can have a significant impact on the tim-
ingof the routedcircuit. For instance, if twoapplicationflipflopswhicharevery far
from each other are put into the same cluster, then the input nets to the XOR for
parity generation (XORpg) will have longer routes than in the case of two neigh-
boring flipflops. These long routes in turn can pose a higher critical impact on
the critical path. For this reason, before altering the technology-level netlist, we
gather the physical information about the application flipflops in lines from 1 to 7.
As the placing and routing process is usually based on heuristics, we run the
place-and-router multiple times (placing try count in line 1) with different seeds.
In this work, we used placing try count = 8 for the experiments. The placer and
router tool optimizes for the best timing, i.e., the shortest critical path.
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Data: technology-level netlist, placing try count, cluster size, partitioning
try count
Result: direct PBED applied technology-level netlist
18 if location-aware partitioning then
19 foreach flipflop category do
20 unclustered flipflops = flipflops in this flipflop category;
21 clusters withmin. distance = ∅;
22 min. total distance =∞ ;
23 clusters for this try = ∅;
24 total distance for this try = 0;
25 for t = 1 to partitioning try count do
26 while there are unclustered flipflops do
27 cluster = new cluster;
28 master = pick a random flipflop;
29 pushmaster to cluster;
30 while there are unclustered flipflops and cluster is not full
do
31 neighbor = pick the nearest unclustered flipflop to
master;
32 push neighbor to cluster;
33 total distance for this try + = distance between
master and neighbor;
34 end
35 push cluster to clusters for this try;
36 end
37 if total distance for this try < min. total distance then
38 min. total distance = total distance for this try;
39 clusters withmin. distance = clusters for this try;
40 end
41 end
42 use clusters withmin. distance as partitioning;
43 end
44 else // random partitioning
45 foreach flipflop category do
46 unclustered flipflops = flipflops in this flipflop category;
47 while there are unclustered flipflops do
48 cluster = new cluster;
49 while there are unclustered flipflops and cluster is not full do
50 random flipflop=pop from unclustered flipflops;
51 push random flipflop to cluster;
52 end
53 end
54 end
55 end
56 foreach cluster do
57 add parity-generation and -check circuitry;
58 end
59 reduce cluster error signals to a single error signal;
Algorithm 4.2:Application of direct PBED to a technology-level netlist p.2
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Figure 4.15: Conversion of a flipflopwith enable input to a basic flipflopwithmul-
tiplexer. This is done to be able to update the flipflop content in case of a bitflip.
At the end of the runs, we select the run with the best timing and use this run
for flipflop location extraction. A primitive on ProASIC3 can be located by a two-
dimensional coordinate.
At line 8, we begin processing the technology-level netlist. All the flipflops
which have an enable input or a negated output must be replaced with a basic
flipflop with clock input, data input, data output, and reset input if applicable.
See figure 4.15 for a visualization. Note that this conversion must also be done
in LTMR. This conversion or remapping is called two tile implementation by the
layout tool, because themultiplexer and flipflops require one tile (i.e., CLB) each.
The elimination of the negated output strictly requires an additional tile, but usu-
ally this negation is propagated to the gates connected to the flipflop output and
does not create additional area overhead.
In the two tile implementation, the multiplexer emulates the enable behavior
by switching between the output of the flipflop and the input data whichmust be
fed to the flipflop when enable signal is active. This is crucial, because an enable
flipflop is not updated in every cycle, but only when the enable input is activated.
If a soft error happens on enable flipflops, these errors can eventually accumulate
and are undetectable for even numbers of bitflips in a cluster.
In the next step, the flipflops are categorized according to cluster size, and
clock and reset signals of flipflops. The flipflops in a cluster must be sensitive to
the same clock signal and edge. Furthermore, all the flipflops in a cluster must
have the same reset type: all active-low or -high. These constraints enable the
connection of the parity flipflop to the same clock and reset signal of the applica-
tion flipflops in the cluster.
The loop beginning at line 19 carries out the partitioning of the flipflops. The
partitioning creates flipflop clusterswith a constant size for eachflipflop category
by using the physical information about the application flipflops gathered in lines
1 to 7.
The clusters are created around amaster flipflop, where neighboring flipflops
are picked from the list of unclustered flipflops list by the distance to the mas-
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ter flipflop (loop at line 26). As distance, the two-dimensional Euclidean distance
without square root is used:
distance = (xmaster − xneighbor)2 + (ymaster − yneighbor)2 (4.31)
New clusters are created until there are no unclustered flipflops left.
This approach does not find the solution with the minimal distance sum over
all clusters, thereforewerepeat thepartitioningmanytimes (loopat line25),which
is determined by the input parameter partitioning try count. For the experiments
in this work, we set this parameter to 1000, i.e., partitioning try count = 1000.
As the figure of merit for each partitioning, we use the sum of all distances
between neighboring and master flipflops in all clusters (line 33), which is called
total distance for this try in the algorithm. For each flipflop category, we pick the
partitioning with theminimum total distance (if block at line 37).
The partitioning of the flipflops was done on the technology-netlist level, be-
cause the layout tool does not provide any programming interface to implement
the partitioning inside the layout tool.
Instead of location-aware partitioning, random partitioning can be used. In
this case, the clusters are filled with random flipflops without respecting their lo-
cation (else block at line 44.)
After the partitioning is completed, the parity-generation and -check circuitry
is added to every cluster. The error signals of all clusters are then reduced to a sin-
gle error signal. This signal is added as an additional primary output to the netlist.
Our partitioning solution is an approximate solution. The partitioning prob-
lemcanbesolvedwithk-meansclusteringwithafixedcluster sizeandthek-means
clustering problem is NP-hard [MNV12]. For our tool we need partitioning with
fixed cluster sizes, so we decided to implement a simple heuristic as a proof of
concept.
In the following, we will analyze the computational complexity of the algo-
rithm. For this purpose, we introduce the following variables:
• cFF number of all flipflops in the netlist
• ccat number of flipflop categories
• cati i’th flipflop category
• cFF,i number of flipflops in category cati
• scl cluster size
• cFF,i,mst number of master flipflops in category cati
• cFF,i,uncl,j number of unclustered flipflops in category cati before j’th itera-
tion
• cparttry partitioning try count (constant)
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• cplacetry placing try count (constant)
In the following, we analyze the time complexity of the algorithm dependent
on the number flipflops cFF in the circuit.
The loop in lines from 1 to 5 is run cplacetry times but depends on the third-party
place-and-route tool, therefore the time complexity cannot be estimated. Line 6
picks from cplacetry routed netlists the one with maximum frequency and can be
processed in cparttry steps, which is constant. Line 7 is done by a third-party parser
and is linear to the components present in the circuit netlist. Lines 8 to 16 iterates
over all flipflops in cFF steps, because categorizing a flipflop means adding it to
an array which includes only flipflops belonging to this category. The loop in lines
from 19 to 43 will be analyzed beginning from the next paragraph. The loop in
lines from 56 to 58 iterates over all clusters and applies parity-generation and -
check circuitry, which in turn iterates over all flipflops in a cluster. So, the loop
in lines from 56 to 58 can be processed in cFF steps. Line 59 iterates over all the
cluster error signals and ORs them, which also corresponds to cFF steps.
The loop from 19 to 43 iterates over all flipflop categories, and partitions the
flipflops in a category cparttry times in lines from 25 to 41. For each partitioning,
clusters are generated in lines from 26 to 36. For eachmaster flipflop in a cluster,
scl − 1 nearest flipflops are picked, whichmeans iterating over all the unclustered
flipflops in the current category.
The number of master flipflops in category cati corresponds to:
cFF,i,mst =
⌈cFF,i
scl
⌉
(4.32)
For each master flipflop in a category, scl − 1 nearest flipflops are picked in lines
from 30 to 34. Before the first iteration, after themaster flipflop for the first clus-
ter hasbeenpicked, there are cFF,i−1unclusteredflipflops, andbefore the second
iteration, there are cFF,i − scl − 1 unclustered flipflops. So, the number of unclus-
tered flipflops before j’th iteration corresponds to:
cFF,i,uncl,j = cFF,i − (j − 1)scl − 1 (4.33)
The master flipflops are picked randomly, thus the partitioning for each flipflop
category is done cparttry times. So, the number of comparisons corresponds to:
ccat∑
i=1
(cparttry ·
cFF,i∑
j=1
(cFF,i,mst · cFF,i,uncl,j)) (4.34)
After we have developed the number of steps in general form,we can carry on
with best- and worst-case analysis.
In best case, every single flipflopbelongs to another category, andno compar-
ison needs to be done:
ccat = cFF =⇒ cFF,i,uncl,j = 0 (4.35)
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Figure 4.16: Impact of location-aware partitioning on the critical path of FSM cir-
cuits. In this plot, critical path overhead delay (tcrit+) for every FSM circuit hard-
enedwith PBED for bothwith location-aware and randompartitioning (part.) are
shown, sorted according to bare circuit area. The x-axis is drawn in logarithmic
scale.
In this case, only the lines from32 to 40are executed,which are processed inO(1)
time. So, in best case the partitioning is accomplished in cparttry · cFF steps, which
corresponds toΩ(cFF).
In worst case, there is only one flipflop category, and the partitioning is done
in cparttry · c2FF steps, which corresponds toO(c2FF).
The lines other than the loop in lines 19 to 43 are processed in cFF steps, so the
time complexity of the algorithm is determined by the loop in lines 19 to 43.
For the evaluation of our location-aware partitioning approach, we synthe-
sized the PBED-hardened FSM and I99T circuits using cluster size of 3 both with
location-aware and random partitioning. The results are ploƦed in figures 4.16
and 4.17.
Contrary to our expectations, location-aware partitioning does not always re-
sult in a beƦer timing. In case of the FSM circuits (figure 4.16), the critical path
difference is less than 1 ns, and in case of the I99T circuits, less than 1.5 ns. The
number of sequential elements for a PBED-hardened circuit does not differ for
both partitioning techniques, and the difference between the number of LUTs is
less than 5. We cannot observe any significant impact of the location-aware par-
titioning. For the best timing, both partitioning techniques should be tried. For
ourexperimental evaluations in thiswork,wesynthesized thePBED-hardenedcir-
cuits with both partitioning techniques and have picked the design with the best
timing.
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Figure 4.17: Impact of location-aware partitioning on the critical path of I99T cir-
cuits. Critical path overhead delay (tcrit+) for every I99T circuit hardened with
PBED for both with location-aware and random partitioning (part.) are shown,
sorted according to bare circuit area. The x-axis is drawn in logarithmic scale.
Chapter 5
Pipelined cluster error signal
reduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced PBED with direct cluster error reduction,
which can have negative impact on the circuit critical path and thus on the tim-
ing. In this chapter, we show an alternative approach based on pipelining of the
cluster error signal reduction. The following sections are structured similar to the
PBED chapter with the exception of the analytical evaluation section. The ana-
lytical comparison was done to assess the theoretical limits of direct PBED and
pipelined PBED is only evaluated using synthesis results.
In the following sections, we first introduce the pipelined PBED. Then, we
present the experimental evaluation and finally discuss the automatic application
of this PBED approach.
5.1 Concept
PBED reduces the cluster error signals to a single circuit error signal. In circuits
with numerousflipflops, this can create a long error detectionpath. Alternatively,
a long error detection path can be broken into shorter paths by using inherent
pipeline structures in a circuit. A data processing circuit, e.g., an instruction pro-
cessor, utilizes many stages to process an instruction before it is evaluated. This
latency introduced by a circuit can be exploited for error detection on themodule
level.
Forexample, if amemorywrite instruction takesfivecyclesbefore correspond-
ingmemory signals are activated and the data word is wriƦen, then it is sufficient
to handle a bitflip in this particular instruction five cycles later - in other words, in
the same cyclewhen thisword iswriƦen tomemory. In thiswork, this approach is
called PBED with pipelined cluster error signal reduction and will be abbreviated
as pipelined PBED in the following.
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Figure 5.1: PBEDwith pipelined cluster error signal reduction: top viewonahard-
ened circuit with d+ 1 stages
Figure 5.2: PBED with pipelined cluster error signal reduction: single stage with
neighbor stages
In contrast to direct PBED, in pipelined PBED, flipflops are grouped according
to their sequential distancedseq toanyprimaryoutputof the circuit. dseq is defined
as theminimumnumberof cycles that abit needs tobe visible atPO. For example,
a FFwhoseoutput is aPOof the circuit has dseq = 0. flipflopswith dseq = dbelong
to a particular error detection stage, which is named stagedED. These stages are
visualized in figure 5.1.
The inner structureof a stage is shown infigure5.2. Analogous todirectPBED,
theflipflopsaregrouped in clusterswithina stage. Stages containanerrorflipflop
FFde , which stores the error signal that is coming from the previous stage, with the
exception of the leftmost stagewith the greatest dseq. The error signal of stagedED,
errord, is generated byORing the buffered error signal from the last stage and the
error signals from the clusters within the stage.
On the one hand, pipelined PBED shrinks the OR-tree for error signal reduc-
tion, which can result in a shorter critical path if theOR-tree is on the critical path.
On theotherhand, pipelinedPBEDresults inmoreoverhead, stages introducean-
other level offlipflopcategory (like reset-,clock-signal) andflipflops fromdifferent
categories cannot be clustered together. This can result in more incomplete clus-
ters and thusmore area overhead.
5.2 Experimental evaluation
In section 5.1, we saw that pipelined PBED is a timing enhancement on the di-
rectPBED. Hence, theexperimental evaluationwill showthedifferencesbetween
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Figure 5.3: Critical path delay overhead (tcrit+) over bare circuit area (Abare) for
LTMR- and PBED-hardened FSM circuits with PBED cluster size of 3
these twoapproaches in overall andadditionally use the former comparisonswith
LTMR from the last chapter.
Samecircuits and sameexperiment conditions fromsection4.3 areused in the
following, so the introductions to the evaluations will be omiƦed and the subsec-
tionwill immediately startwith thedescriptionandevaluationof theexperimental
results.
5.2.1 Finite statemachine (FSM) circuit
Table 5.1 shows the synthesis results for the FSM circuits which are hardened by
pipelined PBEDwith cluster size of 3. The table contains absolute output param-
eters as well as the difference (diff.) to the direct PBED approach.
The area parameters, flipflop count and area do not show a significant differ-
ence (i.e., cFF,diff, Adiff). At least one flipflop is added to every circuit, as the FSM
circuit has two stages andpipelinedPBED requires oneflipflop for every stagebut
the last stage. In some circuits, flipflop count difference raises to three, which is
probably due to optimizations like adding of additional primitives to balance the
load on high fanout nets. The possible overhead due to optimizations also apply
to combinational elements.
The area difference fluctuates more than the flipflop count. Pipelined PBED
introduces stages, which should have a negative impact on area as the cluster er-
ror signals for particular stages are reduced independently. This in turn causes a
non-exhaustive utilization of the three input XOR LUTs and thus more additional
area. But this effect is not clearlyobservablebecause theFSMhasonly twostages.
All in all, the average and maximum difference for sequential elements and total
area stay below 4 and 10 tiles, respectively.
For all of the circuits, the critical path is shorter. Figure 5.3 plots the critical
path delay overheads of pipelined-, direct-PBED and LTMR over the bare circuit
area for a detailed evaluation.
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Table 5.1: Synthesis results for the FSM circuits hardened by pipelined PBEDwith
cluster size of 3. Absolute (abs.) values as well as differences (diff.) to the direct
PBED are shown. A positive difference means a higher value for the pipelined
PBED. The last row shows the average values for the differences.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
circ. abs. diff. abs. diff. abs. diff.
1 41 1 191 1 9.29 -0.21
2 77 1 389 1 9.64 -0.09
3 112 1 585 0 10.02 -0.04
4 148 1 783 0 10.29 -0.15
5 184 1 970 -1 10.31 -0.21
6 220 1 1186 0 10.45 -0.39
7 256 1 1389 2 10.50 -0.16
8 292 1 1544 -1 10.61 -0.45
9 328 1 1731 1 10.78 -0.60
10 364 1 1921 1 11.01 -0.58
11 400 1 2142 -3 11.19 -0.46
12 437 1 2365 -2 11.15 -0.72
13 475 3 2603 3 11.49 -0.48
14 511 3 2800 4 11.48 -0.48
15 547 3 2989 1 11.64 -0.73
16 583 3 3264 2 11.61 -0.92
17 619 3 3386 -1 11.79 -0.69
18 655 3 3613 4 11.85 -1.19
19 689 1 3761 3 11.83 -0.70
20 725 1 3970 1 12.01 -0.94
21 763 3 4168 5 12.14 -0.88
22 799 3 4395 3 12.26 -0.68
23 835 3 4609 -4 12.42 -1.04
24 873 3 4842 1 12.61 -0.66
25 908 2 5021 1 12.48 -1.03
26 944 2 5244 -4 12.63 -1.48
27 980 2 5472 2 12.54 -1.11
28 1015 1 5619 -8 12.91 -1.00
29 1052 2 5850 9 12.99 -1.38
30 1087 1 6051 -9 13.07 -0.92
31 1123 1 6236 0 - -
avg. 1.83 0.02 -0.68
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Table 5.2: Minimum andmaximum values for derived parameters for PBED hard-
ened FSM circuits for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 0.06 - 4.42 2.31 - 2.97 0.78 - 0.84
3 1.10 - 4.23 1.84 - 2.46 0.62 - 0.69
4 1.28 - 4.25 1.55 - 2.18 0.52 - 0.61
5 1.67 - 4.54 1.49 - 2.11 0.50 - 0.58
6 1.88 - 4.55 1.51 - 2.10 0.51 - 0.59
7 2.25 - 4.71 1.39 - 2.04 0.47 - 0.57
8 2.35 - 5.10 1.41 - 1.98 0.48 - 0.55
9 2.25 - 5.13 1.39 - 1.96 0.47 - 0.54
For the bare circuit areas greater than 500CLBs, the critical path overhead is
improved by 0.5 to 2 ns, but LTMR has still about 1 to 2 ns less critical path over-
head. For circuit area less than 500, all hardening techniques lead to similar re-
sults.
Weomitdetailed results foreachcircuitandcluster size likewedid insection4.3,
because pipelining does not significantly change the impact of cluster size. In-
steadofdetailed results, table5.2 summarizes theminimumandmaximumvalues
for the derived values for each cluster size.
5.2.2 I99T circuits
Table 5.3 shows synthesis results for I99T circuits hardened by pipelined PBED
with cluster size of 3.
In all circuits theflipflopcountdifference to thedirectPBED isgreater than the
total stage countwithout the last stage (cFF,diff. >= cstage−1), which supports the
plausibility of the resulted flipflop count.
Pipelined PBED can result in shorter critical path, but not always. The critical
path delay difference to direct PBED is less than 1.25 ns. Figure 5.4 shows the crit-
ical pathdelayof thehardened circuits sortedaccording to thebare circuit area. In
most cases PBED results in a shorter critical path than LTMR. The exceptions are
the circuits b18 and b21, in which pipelined-PBED results in a longer critical path
than the LTMR.
Like in subsection 5.2.1, we omit detailed analysis by each cluster size and cir-
cuit andminimumandmaximum values for the derived parameters for each clus-
ter size in table 5.4, as the pipelining does not change the impact of cluster size
variation.
Finally, we analyzed the relative flipflop count over the stages in I99T circuits.
Figure 5.5 shows the relative flipflop count in percent for a particular circuit.
We observe that in most circuits about half of the flipflops have a distance of
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Table 5.3: Synthesis results for I99T circuits hardened by pipelined PBED with
cluster size of 3. Additionally, in the last column the total stage count (cstage) gath-
eredby thePBEDtool is printed. For the remainingparameters confer to table5.1.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
circ. abs. diff. abs. diff. abs. diff. cstage
b02 9 1 23 0 5.56 0.42 1
b01 19 2 49 2 5.85 0.01 2
b06 15 2 48 1 6.37 -0.30 1
b08 35 2 133 3 11.55 -0.30 2
b03 55 7 160 5 9.12 -0.00 5
b09 55 12 161 9 9.79 -0.91 8
b10 40 2 151 2 7.82 -0.04 2
b13 90 5 277 3 9.12 0.05 3
b07 69 2 258 -1 14.87 0.03 2
b11 58 4 322 3 17.24 -0.92 2
b04 104 4 516 1 24.98 -0.73 4
b05 65 1 470 2 25.61 -0.02 1
b12 189 5 881 3 16.68 -0.16 4
b14 328 3 4062 2 49.05 -1.09 2
b15 664 5 5549 4 34.40 -0.82 3
b20 658 3 8808 2 48.73 -0.58 3
b21 653 3 8930 5 49.16 0.53 3
b22 940 3 12827 1 49.27 0.16 3
b17 2099 6 16867 -1 36.32 0.31 5
b18 4872 5 42495 2 50.69 1.25 5
b19 9649 5 76864 -5 - - 5
avg. 3.90 2.05 -0.16
100 1,000 10,000
1
2
3
4
bare circuit area (Aba)
tcrit+ (ns) LTMR
direct PBEDwith scl = 3
pipelined PBEDwith scl = 3
Figure 5.4: Critical path delay overhead (tcrit+) over bare circuit area (Abare) for
LTMR- and PBED-hardened circuits with PBED cluster size of 3
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Figure 5.5: The distribution of flipflops over the stages for every I99T circuit.
staged is a stagewitha sequential distanceofd to theprimaryoutputof thecircuit.
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Table 5.4: Minimumandmaximum values for derived parameters for PBED hard-
ened I99T circuits for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 -0.44 - 1.51 2.31 - 3.20 0.79 - 1.01
3 0.12 - 4.60 1.82 - 2.70 0.62 - 0.79
4 -0.01 - 9.34 1.56 - 2.50 0.55 - 0.75
5 0.30 - 11.32 1.46 - 2.34 0.50 - 0.75
6 0.52 - 6.60 1.50 - 2.42 0.51 - 0.75
7 0.60 - 5.95 1.54 - 2.41 0.52 - 0.75
8 0.49 - 6.38 1.41 - 2.32 0.48 - 0.75
9 0.33 - 7.01 1.36 - 2.30 0.46 - 0.75
one cycle to the output. Although this allows for a pipelining in cluster error sig-
nal reduction, a more homogeneous distribution of the flipflops should result in
beƦer timing for pipelined PBED.
5.3 Automatic application
Also pipelined PBED can be automatically applied to a technology-level netlist.
Our tool thatwe introduced in the last chapter also supports pipelinedPBED. The
pseudocodeof thepipelinedPBEDapplicationprogram is shown inalgorithm5.1.
Compared to thedirectPBEDapproach, in pipelinedPBED, the sequential dis-
tance to PO dseq of every flipflopmust be determined. For this purpose, a flipflop-
only dataflowgraph is generatedby seƦing thePOsas sink vertexes andexploring
how the flipflops are connected to each other and to the primary output by us-
ing breadth-first search in the loop at line 7+1. While traversing, the flipflops are
annotated with dseq,POi to each single PO. Subsequently, the minimum of these
dseq,POis is determined at line 14+1, which corresponds to dseq to the output:
dseq = min∀i dseq,POi (5.1)
In the next step (line 15), the flipflops are put to clusters like in direct PBED,
but cluster generation in pipelined approach additionally respects the sequential
distance to theprimaryoutput, thatnotonly theflipflopswith thesameclockedge
and reset are allowed to be in the same cluster, but also with the same sequential
distance.
Then, the clusters are generated. In the loop at line 45+1, the clusters are put
into error detection stageswith respective sequential distance to the primary out-
put. Finally, the stages are interconnected.
In the following, we analyze the time complexity introduced by the pipelined
PBED approach when compared to the direct approach. For this purpose, we in-
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Result: pipelined PBED applied technology-level netlist
...
7+1 foreach primary output (PO) do
7+2 build a flipflop dataflow graph with this PO as sink vertex and
annotate the flipflops with sequential distance to this PO;
7+3 end
8 foreach flipflop do
...
14+1 determinemin. sequential distance to output;
15 categorize according to… andmin. sequential distance to output;
16 end
...
59 reduce cluster error signals to a single error signal;
59+1 for sequential distance (dseq)=max to 0 do
59+2 put clusters with dseq to a new stage;
59+3 reduce cluster error signals to a single error signal;
59+4 merge the error signal from the previous stage;
59+5 add an error flipflop to the stage;
59+6 end
Algorithm 5.1: Application of pipelined PBED to a technology-level netlist.
Only the differences to algorithm 4.1 are shown. Added lines are labeled as
l + a, whichmeans a’th line added after the l’th line from algorithm 4.1.
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troduce following variables additional to the variables that we introduced in sec-
tion 4.4:
• cLUT number of all LUTs in the netlist
• cPO number of primary outputs in the netlist
• dseq,max maximum sequential distance in the netlist
• ccl number of clusters in the circuit
The loop in line 7+1 does a breadth-first search on a connected graph (the netlist)
for each primary output. Firstly, we do the worst case analysis. A dense con-
nected graph can be processed inO(n2) time, where n is the number of vertexes.
So, building the flipflop data-graph for all primary outputs corresponds toO(cPO ·
(cLUT+cFF)2). Generally,most of the components of the netlist are traversed after
some of the primary outputs have been processed, and the connectivity informa-
tion (i.e., the neighbors of a flipflop) can be cached. Therefore, the time complex-
ity can be reduced toO((cLUT+cFF)2). In best case, wehave a sparse graph,which
corresponds toΩ(cLUT + cFF). If we assume that cLUT = const · cFF, the time com-
plexity can be reduced toO(c2FF) andΩ(cFF).
The line 14+1 corresponds to comparison of cPO values, but cPO cannot be de-
termined exactly. If we assume that the number of primary outputs do not ex-
ceed the number of flipflops in the circuit, the line 15 can be processed inO(cFF)
and Ω(1) time. These lines are processed for each flipflop, so they correspond to
cFF · (cFF + 1) steps and toO(c2FF) andΩ(cFF).
The loop in line 45+1 includes operations which iterate over the clusters, that
have a specific sequential distance. So, in total, this loop iterates over all flipflop
clusters, and is processed in ccl steps. In worst case, every flipflop belongs to a
different category, and in best case to the same category. This corresponds to
O(cFF) andΩ(1).
Timecomplexityof thedirectPBEDapproachcorresponds toO(c2FF)andΩ(cFF),
whichwasdiscussed insection4.4. Wesee that the timecomplexity isnotchanged
by the additional steps introduced by the pipelined PBED approach.
Chapter 6
Transaction-based processing
& recovery
Inpreviouschapters,wepresentedandevaluatedtheerrordetectionpartofEDFT.
A fault-tolerant system should provide end-to-end reliability, i.e., after error de-
tection, the system should recover itself from the erroneous state. As shown in
figure 6.1, the rest of EDFT is based on:
• system recovery in the target circuit
– circuit isolation
– circuit reset
• detection and recovery in the user component
– transaction-based processing
System recovery reacts to a detected error and ensures a system statewithout
errors. Due to error detection-only (parity) approach instead of error-correcting
codes in our approach, it is not possible to compensate an error immediately and
recover the system. Instead, recovery is done by circuit isolation (fault masking),
and circuit reset (rollforward). Transaction-basedprocessing is for error detection
and system recovery in the user component.
In the next sections,wefirst present and evaluate the system recovery compo-
nents for the target circuit, and then for the user component. Finally, we discuss
their automatic application.
6.1 Recovery in the target circuit
System recovery in the target circuit consists of the circuit isolation and circuit re-
set components. Like PBED, system recovery can be implemented in a transpar-
ent fashion to the target circuit as shown in figures 6.2 and 6.3.
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Figure 6.1: EDFT applied on the reference architecture (Figure 2.8 reused)
We present the two components in detail in subsections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.
6.1.1 Circuit isolation
The goal of isolation is that an error in the target circuit does not propagate to the
rest of the system. As the circuit recovery can take multiple clock cycles (e.g., an
asynchronous reset over multiple clock cycles), an erroneous data word in target
circuit can propagate to neighboring circuits and cause additional errors. Conse-
quently, the reaction latency to an error must be bounded.
Isolationcanbeachieved, e.g., bystoppingtheclock for the targetcircuit (clock
gating) or masking its output signals. In our work, we concentrated onmasking.
Generally, circuit interfacescontaincontrol signals,whichcontrol thedataflow.
Anexample is thewrite-enable signal onamemory interface. As longas thewrite-
enable signal is not activated, no data will be transferred to the neighbor circuit.
So, if the circuit interface includes control signals, further resources can be saved
by only masking the control signals like write- and read-enable as shown in fig-
ure 6.3.
An example implementation of the circuit isolationwith logicalmasking of the
control signals is shown in figure 6.4. As long as the reset signal is active and the
circuit is being recovered, the output control signals staymasked.
6.1. RECOVERY IN THE TARGET CIRCUIT 95
target
circuit
concurrent
error
detection
system
recovery
/
PI
/
PO
/
PIw
/
POw
/flipflop
signals
error
Figure 6.2: Overview of target circuit’s system recovery components. PI and PO
stand for primary-input and -output of the target circuit, respectively. The sub-
script w stands for wrapped. Error handling module wraps the target circuit for
recovering and isolating the circuit.
Figure 6.3: Detection and recovery applied on the reference processing architec-
ture from section 1.1. To save resources, only the control signals aremasked. (Fig-
ure 1.5 reused.)
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Figure 6.4: Example implementation of the system recovery for the target circuit.
When the error signal is active then the control signals are masked to isolate the
circuit logically in the same cycle. In subsequent cycles, the asynchronous reset
signal is hold active and the circuit is reset.
6.1.2 Circuit reset
After an error, the circuit can be in an indeterminable state. The aim of error han-
dling is to put the target circuit to a determined state that data processing can
continue, e.g., to the state at the end of the last successful transaction.
The easiest recovery approach is to put the circuit to the start state by activat-
ing the reset signal, which is feasible if the target circuit always lands on the start
state after one transaction is processed. We chose this approach for our evalua-
tion. In opposite cases, where the circuit is at different states at the beginning of
a transaction, the recovery must concurrently observe the state of the circuit and
recover the circuit to the respective start state.
In figure 6.4, we show an example of an asynchronous reset-based recovery
approach. A shift register enables a reset that is active many clock cycles. The
number of flipflops in the shift register must be chosen such that all flipflops in
the circuit are guaranteed to be reset after the respective number of clock cycles.
Consequently, the size of the shift register sSR is dependent on the longest reset
path to a flipflop (critical reset path tcrit,rst), the circuit clock period tclk, and can be
calculated by the following equation:
sSR =
⌈
tcrit,rst
tclk
⌉
(6.1)
It is obvious that the circuit reset is a sequential circuit as well and susceptible
to soft errors. Consequently, it must be sufficiently protected due to following
threats:
• During the initial state of the shift register, one or more bitflips in the laƦer
flipflops of the shift register activates the reset of the target circuit, which
results in a shorter reset duration.
• During the active state of the shift register, in other words, when the circuit
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is being reset, one or more bitflips can interrupt the reset of the circuit. In
this case, a bitflipwould cause a short reset, which has a lowprobability due
to therelatively small areaof theshift register comparedto the targetcircuit.
In both casesnot all flipflops in the circuit are initializedand this can causea circuit
failure. Consequently, the reset circuit should be hardened by LTMR.
6.2 Transaction-based processing
Many sequential circuits process data by receiving a request and transmiƦing a
response. Sending a response is not only important for the flow control but also
for detecting an error. Due to the fact that we allow errors in the target circuit
that cannot be corrected immediately, the system environment which utilizes the
target circuit can use transaction-based processing. This gives the environment
the opportunity to repeat the last processing request (i.e., resend the last packet)
after a timeout, if the target circuit cannot send any response due to a recovery
event. Therefore, a system implementing EDFT should incorporate a transaction-
based processing scheme.
In this section, we first present the concept and provide a specification in sub-
section 6.2.1. Using this specification, we show that the systemwill not fail under
the fault model that we presume in subsection 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Concept
In our previous example in section 1.1, we have proposed a communication proto-
col basedon transactions,which is re-shown infigure6.5. In this example system,
we achieve tolerance against SEUs by collaboration of hardware and software.
The hardware detects an error, stops the transaction and the software retries the
transaction. Compared to error correction on hardware like LTMR, which mostly
occurs in every clock cycle ensuring that an error does not cause data corruption,
a bit error in EDFT can lead to data corruption and hence to an unexpected loss of
processing context in a system, inwhich this circuit is incorporated. To ensure de-
terministic data processing in this context, the processing for themissionmust be
carried out in smaller chunks, each acknowledged by circuit B that no corruption
due to bitflips has taken place. We call this kind of handshaked data processing
transaction-based processing.
In this section, we generalize our approach by providing a system specifica-
tion.
A data processing circuit (cf. circuit B shown in figure 1.1) is a clocked circuit
with internal memory which can transfer a data word in every clock cycle during
processing. Processed data is transferred to or from a buffer memory. A buffer
memory is for instancea random-access (RAM)orfirst-infirst-out (FIFO)memory,
like two FIFOs and the RAM shown in figure 1.1.
A buffer stores one ormanydatawords. Thesewords canbeused in twoways:
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Figure 6.5: Sequence diagram of the communication protocol of our reference
system in section 1.1, which is based on transactions. A transaction consists of a
request (req) and a response (resp). The left diagram shows a normal sequence:
every request is followed by a response. On the right, the error behavior is visual-
ized: if still no responseafter a timeout is received, the last transaction is repeated.
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trans-
action
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Figure 6.6: Data processing circuit receives a request from the transaction buffer
andwrites the response after processing. For communicating with other circuits,
miscellaneous buffers are used.
• asamemory-mappedcommunication interface, e.g.,writingaspecificword
to a specific address starts sending UART bits to a peer. Amemory location
holding such a word is called an action triggering address. When the com-
munication is completed, a status word indicates if a communication was
successful or has failed.
• as an input or output for data processing, e.g., a checksum circuit reads the
input words, processes the checksum and writes checksum words back to
thebuffer. Wecall amemory locationholdingsuchawordapassiveaddress.
A transaction buffer (cf. the FIFOs in figure 1.1) is always present and used
for geƦing processing data input and writing back the output. Other buffers can
be present for communicating with other circuits (cf. RAM for memory-mapped
communication interface in figure 1.1 and they are calledmiscellaneous buffers.
This generalized view on the data processing circuit is visualized in figure 6.6. All
buffers are sufficiently protected against soft errors, for instancebyusing anerror
detection and correction code.
Processing data is sent by a master (cf. processor in figure 1.1) and the sent
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cycleclk t t+ 1 . . . t+ q . . . t+ 1 + p
tb. i/ reqn(0) reqn(1) . . . reqn(q)
tb. /o respn(0) . . . . . . respn(p)
mb. i/o data . . . . . . data
transactionn
Figure 6.7: An example transaction visualized on cycle level. The processing cir-
cuit (cf. figure 6.6) processes request words and writes the response words back
to the transaction buffer (tb.). During one clock cycle (cycleclk), one request word
(reqn(i)) of a request (reqn) or one responseword (respn(i)) of a response (respn)
can be transferred. During the transaction, also data transfer to/from miscella-
neous buffers (mb.) is possible. i/: input, /o: output, i/o: input or output. Note
that a response does not have to start at t+ 1, but may start later.
data is called a request. The data processing circuit processes the request as a
slave and writes the output on the transaction buffer, which is called a response.
Request and response consist of at least one or many consecutive words. A re-
quest and the response to this requestmake up aprocessing transaction. A trans-
action on cycle level is visualized in figure 6.7.
A transaction fails, if the last word of the respective response is not present
in the transaction buffer after a timeout. In this case the respective request is re-
peated. Many consecutive transactionsmake up a data processingmission.
6.2.2 Fault tolerance analysis
The goal of our approach is to ensure that the mission is completed without any
erroneous data in the mission output. In this subsection, we show that our pro-
posed approach meets the fault tolerance goal. Note that data will be corrupted
due to SEUs, but as long as the erroneous data do not propagate from the slave
to themaster or other neighboring circuits, it is not an error from themission per-
spective.
If an SEU happens durina a clock cycle, then a bitflip in a cluster will be ob-
servable in the next clock cycle. EDFT can detect this error and mask the circuit
outputs in the same cycle. At the same time, the recovery is activated and the cir-
cuit is brought to a known state by a reset. As long as the circuit is in recovery, the
circuit outputs staymasked. In summary, in EDFT:
• a bit error is detected in the next clock cycle
• a bit error cannot propagate outside the circuit and eventually cause silent
data corruption
Consequently, if an error is detected during a transaction, the master will not get
a response and subsequently retry the transaction without any data corruption.
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A transaction succeeds or fails as a whole, but the slave processes the data on
every clock cycle. Consequently, the master cannot know the state of a miscella-
neous buffer after an SEU. To avoid this, the master must pay aƦention to how
the the requests to the slave are built. Although the actual solution is application
dependent, in the following we provide an example approach how the requests
can be built.
If an incomplete or no response is received by the master in the timeout win-
dow, then a recovery procedure by themaster is initiated.
If an error happens during processing of a transaction involving only passive
addresses, then the simplest approach is to retry the last request. The reason is:
• after a read request, the state of themiscellaneous buffers do not change
• after awrite request, part of themiscellaneous buffersmay change, but this
does not trigger an action. Consequently, the last request can be retried.
In both cases also a readbackwith partial write request can be issued, if this is less
time-consuming than retrying.
In case of action triggering addresses, if an error happens during processing
of a read transaction, then the simplest approach is the retry of the last request
similar to the above reason. If this is a write action (e.g., triggering a data trans-
mission to a subsystem), then retrying retriggers the last operation, which can be
undesirable and dangerous. In this case, first a read request to the status regis-
ter of the respectivememory-mapped interface should be issued to see if the trig-
gered action succeeded or not. Then, awrite request can be issued accordingly. It
is obvious that not only the design but also the correct use of the communication
protocol is important for the fault tolerance of the system.
6.3 Experimental evaluation
In this section,weevaluate thesystemimpactsof systemrecoveryandtransaction-
based processing. System recovery is evaluated in subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 by
its area and timing impacts similar in the last two chapters 4 and 5. Transaction-
based processing is based on recomputation and thus evaluated by its processing
time impact in subsection 6.3.3.
The evaluation of the impacts of transaction-based processing on the hard-
ware and software components is not straightforward, because the transaction
handling depends on the communication protocol between the user and provider
component, which can be arbitrary.
If we assumeabidirectional protocolwhere the provider component has to re-
ply every request fromtheuser component. In this case, theprotocolmust beable
to retransmit the last request to the provider component, if there is no response
or the response is negative. In terms of programming resources, this means that
the user program should buffer every request until there is a positive response to
the last request.
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Transaction-basedprocessing isnotpossibleonaprotocolwhere theusercom-
ponent sends a request to the provider component and assumes that the request
will be processed correctly. This applies to protocols, in which not every request
is responded, and also to unidirectional protocols. In this case, the protocol must
be changed to support responses from the provider component, which can result
in redesigning both user and provider component.
For the evaluation of the system recovery circuit, we took the pipelined PBED
as error detection component and input the error signal to the system recovery
circuit. The system recovery circuit was hardened using LTMR and for the reset
circuit, we chose the reset duration of three cycles for all circuits. As we discussed
in section 6.1.1, only control outputs should be masked to save area. In the FSM
circuits, we indeed masked the control signal outputs. In the I99T circuits, we
masked all the output signals, because there is no detailed documentation avail-
able about the semantics of the primary output signals.
6.3.1 FSM
Table6.1 shows theareadifferences (diff.) of thePBEDwith systemrecovery com-
ponent compared to the pipelined PBED approach without system recovery for
the cluster size of three. The reset duration of three cycles was realized by a two
bit counter by the synthesizer. This counter triplicated results in six flipflops and
in the evaluation of PBED, we used one flipflop as a placeholder for the system
recovery circuit to include the timing effects of the parity check andOR-tree. Con-
sequently, all circuits have a flipflop difference of five.
The combinational area difference is not directly presented on table 6.1, but
can be obtained by subtracting flipflop count from the area (A − cFF). Combi-
national area difference is caused by majority voters for the triplicated flipflops,
gates formaskingof the control signals, and the counter. The areadifferencefluc-
tuates probably due to optimizations.
System recovery component causes 13 to 25 CLBs for all circuits, therefore the
impact is significant for circuits with relatively small area. We additionally calcu-
lated theareaoverhead (bare circuit areaas reference)per applicationflipflopand
the area overhead ratio to LTMR approach. In average, the overhead per applica-
tionflipflop is about 2.5 andEDFTapproach saves in average30%of theoverhead
that would be caused by LTMR for cluster size of 3.
The critical path difference to pipelinedPBED is less than 2 ns and is about 1 ns
in average. The critical path difference is visualized in figure 6.8. In worst case,
a critical path overhead of about 5 ns is caused, which is about 2.5 ns more than
LTMR.
Systemrecoverydoesnot change the impactof cluster sizevariation, therefore
weonly summarize theminimumandmaximumvalues for thederivedparameters
in table 6.2. We see that EDFT can save up to 54%of the area overhead caused by
LTMRwith amaximum critical path overhead of 6 ns.
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Table 6.1: Synthesis results for the FSM circuits hardened by pipelined PBEDwith
cluster size of 3 and system recovery (abbreviated as PPR meaning pipelined
PBED with recovery). Absolute (abs.) values as well as differences (diff.) to the
version without system recovery from chapter 5 (was abbreviated as PP) are
shown. A positive difference means a higher value for the version with system
recovery. The last row shows the average values for the differences.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
circ. abs. diff. abs. diff. abs. diff. A+,PPRcFF,ba
A+,PPR
A+,LT
1 46 5 205 14 9.46 0.17 2.44 0.82
2 82 5 403 14 9.94 0.30 2.12 0.72
3 117 5 598 13 10.03 0.01 2.63 0.73
4 153 5 800 17 10.31 0.03 2.62 0.74
5 189 5 987 17 10.29 -0.02 2.59 0.72
6 225 5 1204 18 10.59 0.14 2.57 0.70
7 261 5 1403 14 11.09 0.59 2.53 0.70
8 297 5 1559 15 11.30 0.69 2.53 0.70
9 333 5 1745 14 11.82 1.04 2.52 0.69
10 369 5 1935 14 11.79 0.78 2.52 0.69
11 405 5 2162 20 11.84 0.66 2.52 0.70
12 442 5 2385 20 11.82 0.67 2.50 0.68
13 480 5 2620 17 12.32 0.83 2.51 0.69
14 516 5 2815 15 12.62 1.14 2.51 0.70
15 552 5 3006 17 12.80 1.16 2.50 0.69
16 588 5 3280 16 12.62 1.01 2.50 0.70
17 624 5 3407 21 12.75 0.97 2.50 0.69
18 660 5 3629 16 13.12 1.27 2.49 0.70
19 694 5 3777 16 13.14 1.31 2.49 0.68
20 730 5 3985 15 13.16 1.16 2.49 0.67
21 768 5 4184 16 13.49 1.35 2.49 0.68
22 804 5 4409 14 13.49 1.23 2.49 0.68
23 840 5 4624 15 13.42 1.00 2.48 0.68
24 878 5 4856 14 13.69 1.08 2.48 0.69
25 913 5 5038 17 13.45 0.97 2.48 0.68
26 949 5 5268 24 13.58 0.95 2.48 0.68
27 985 5 5490 18 13.73 1.19 2.49 0.69
28 1020 5 5640 21 13.88 0.96 2.48 0.68
29 1057 5 5867 17 14.26 1.26 2.48 0.68
30 1092 5 6076 25 14.07 1.00 2.48 0.69
31 1128 5 6253 17 - - 2.48 0.68
avg. 5.00 18.57 0.83 2.49 0.70
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pipelined PBEDwith scl = 3
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and system recovery
Figure 6.8: Critical path delay overheads (tcrit+) over bare circuit area (Abare) for
LTMR and both PBED techniques with cluster size of 3. Points for the LTMR-
hardened circuits for Abare > 3750 do not exist, because they did not fit into the
FPGA.
Table 6.2: Minimumandmaximum values for derived parameters for PBED hard-
ened FSM circuits with recovery for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 0.06 - 5.30 2.31 - 3.14 0.78 - 0.96
3 1.10 - 5.38 1.84 - 2.63 0.62 - 0.82
4 1.23 - 5.45 1.55 - 2.37 0.52 - 0.76
5 1.41 - 5.24 1.49 - 2.27 0.50 - 0.72
6 1.70 - 5.35 1.51 - 2.30 0.51 - 0.69
7 1.90 - 5.55 1.39 - 2.21 0.47 - 0.68
8 2.33 - 5.60 1.41 - 2.11 0.48 - 0.68
9 2.25 - 5.72 1.39 - 2.18 0.47 - 0.68
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Figure 6.9: Critical path delay overheads (tcrit+) over bare circuit area (Abare) for
LTMR and both PBED techniques with cluster size of 3
6.3.2 I99T circuits
The structure of data presented in this subsection (table 6.3, 6.4, figure 6.9) is
similar to the last subsection 6.3.1.
Table 6.3 shows that the flipflop difference is nearly constant at 5 as in the re-
sultsof theFSMcircuit. A significantfluctuationcanbeobserved in theareadiffer-
ence compared to the FSM circuit. The reason is that every circuit has a different
numberofprimaryoutputnets, andwedidnotonlymask thecontrol signals in the
primary output nets, but all primary output nets. For instance, b17 has 98primary
output nets, which creates a relatively high area overheaddue to neededmasking
gates. Still, EDFT can save 27% of the area overhead caused by the LTMR in b17.
On the other hand, EDFT can also cause more overhead than LTMR like in rela-
tively small circuits like b06, which has an area of 64 CLBs. The circuits b02 and
b05 also cause more area overhead than LTMR, and the reason for these circuits
was explained in subsection 4.3.2.
The critical path impact can be beƦer analyzed using figure 6.9, which also
plots LTMR and pipelined PBEDwithout system recovery critical path overheads.
In most cases, PBED with and without system recovery have similar critical path
overhead and the EDFT causes less critical path overhead than LTMR. Only b18
and b20 result in a longer critical path than LTMR and the critical path difference
stays below 2ns in these cases.
Similar to subsection 6.3.1, we only summarize the minimum and maximum
values for the derived parameters and for different cluster sizes in table 6.4. Com-
pared to theminimumandmaximumvalueswithout recovery in table 5.4, the up-
per bounds for the critical path overheads are not changed for most cluster sizes,
and if changed, the increase is below 1 ns. We see that EDFT can save up to 54%
of the area overhead caused by LTMR.
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Table 6.3: Synthesis results for I99T circuits hardened by pipelined PBED with
cluster size of 3 and system recovery. For the remaining parameters confer to ta-
ble 6.1.
cFF A tcrit (ns)
circ. abs. diff. abs. diff. abs. diff. A+,PPRcFF,ba
A+,PPR
A+,LT
b02 14 5 35 12 5.69 0.13 5.25 1.75
b01 24 5 62 13 5.92 0.08 3.50 1.13
b06 20 5 64 16 6.66 0.29 4.00 1.33
b08 40 5 147 14 11.49 -0.06 2.67 0.90
b03 60 5 175 15 9.23 0.11 2.52 0.89
b09 60 5 173 12 9.64 -0.15 2.61 0.89
b10 45 5 168 17 7.76 -0.06 2.71 0.90
b13 95 5 296 19 9.12 0.00 2.57 0.80
b07 74 5 277 19 14.90 0.03 2.25 0.76
b11 63 5 341 19 18.35 1.11 2.43 0.83
b04 109 5 536 20 24.94 -0.04 3.00 0.79
b05 70 5 507 37 25.59 -0.03 2.73 1.18
b12 194 5 899 18 17.01 0.34 2.85 0.77
b14 333 5 4131 69 49.87 0.82 3.00 0.78
b15 669 5 5633 84 34.56 0.16 2.59 0.76
b20 663 5 8841 33 51.06 2.33 2.74 0.73
b21 658 5 8962 32 48.07 -1.10 2.76 0.72
b22 945 5 12858 31 48.96 -0.30 2.70 0.72
b17 2104 5 16982 115 36.93 0.62 2.51 0.73
b18 4877 5 42536 41 50.84 0.14 2.47 0.73
b19 9654 5 76923 59 - - 2.47 0.72
avg. 5.00 33.10 0.22 2.87 0.90
Table 6.4: Minimumandmaximum values for derived parameters for PBEDhard-
ened I99T circuits with recovery for various cluster sizes (scl)
scl tcrit+ (ns) A+cFF,ba
A+,PB
A+,LT
2 -0.44 - 2.29 2.31 - 5.75 0.79 - 1.92
3 -0.02 - 5.37 1.82 - 5.25 0.62 - 1.75
4 -0.01 - 14.12 1.56 - 5.25 0.55 - 1.75
5 -0.08 - 11.87 1.46 - 5.25 0.50 - 1.75
6 0.52 - 7.14 1.50 - 5.25 0.51 - 1.75
7 0.51 - 6.08 1.54 - 5.25 0.52 - 1.75
8 0.46 - 7.04 1.41 - 5.25 0.48 - 1.75
9 0.33 - 7.99 1.36 - 5.25 0.46 - 1.75
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Write transmit buffer (200words)
Trigger transmission (1 word)
Wait for 100 cycles
Read transmit buffer (55 words)
response
timeout
response
timeout
timeout
response
Figure 6.10: Simplified flow diagram of one single memory access block. It con-
sists of three transactions. The transactions are retried by the software if there is
no response after the timeout has passed.
6.3.3 Processing time penalty
Compared to local error handling of LTMR, EDFT handles an error by recomputa-
tion. This imposes a processing time penalty on the system. To compare the run-
time performance of LTMR and EDFT under injection of bitflips, we implemented
abitflip injection tool anda testbenchwhichperformsamission. Themission con-
sists of 100 memory access blocks. Each memory access block consists of three
subsequent memory accesses. One single memory access block is visualized in
figure 6.10. The block starts with a write transaction consisting of 200 words,
which resembles data that should be sent to a subsystem by the FPGA. After the
data are wriƦen, the subsystem data transmission is activated by a single word
access. The subsystem responds in a predefined timewindowof 100 cycles. After
a delay of 100 cycles, the subsystem response consisting of 55 words is read. At
the end of themission, the time needed for the wholemission is measured.
At every clock cycle, thebitflip injection tool iterates over all flipflops in the tar-
get circuit and flips the flipflop bits according to the given probability p randomly.
Probability p is defined as the bitflip probability per clock cycle for a single flipflop.
The randomnumbers generated for the bitflip injection are dependent on a seed.
We run the mission for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.0001, and for one single p, the simulation was
run with 32 different seeds.
In LTMR, the error is corrected in the same clock cycle, but EDFT requires that
the error is corrected by the software by repeating the failed memory access re-
quest, which in turn causes additional processing delays. Figure 6.11 shows rela-
tiveprocessing timeneededbyEDFT for thegivenmission. Theprocessing timeof
EDFT is ploƦed relative to theLTMRprocessing time,which is constant. ForEDFT,
theprocessing time increaseswith increasingbitflipprobabilityp, asa failedmem-
6.4. AUTOMATIC APPLICATION 107
Figure 6.11: ScaƦerplot of relative processing time for a givenmission. The factor
is relative to the processing time of LTMR.
ory access request must be repeated. The time loss due to retransmission is at
least the time required to transmit the failed request. At higher p, if the bitflip rate
equals to the memory access request rate, the processing time would be infinite.
Therefore, the processing time grows exponentially in respect to p. Note that, at
the simulated p interval, therewere no undetected errors (e.g., multiple bitflips in
a PBED cluster) for both techniques.
For comparison, note that, assuming one year mission in the L2 orbit (second
Lagrangian point, about 1.5 million km away from earth) under 1/cm² shielding,
a programmed circuit with 5000 flipflops on a ProASIC RTPE3000L FPGA has
four SEUs [BSV11, ch. 7]. Assuming that this design runs at 20MHz, then p for
thismission is calculated by dividing the errors per year by the number of cycles in
one year:
p = 4/5000/365/24/60/60/(20× 106)
≈ 1.3× 10−18 (6.2)
Assuming the error rate fromeq. 6.2 and transactionswith amaximum length
of 103 cycles, make the time penalty per year insignificant.
6.4 Automatic application
6.4.1 Logical masking of control signals
Logical masking of control signals can be easily implemented, if the control sig-
nals of the target circuit primary output are known. The synthesizable VHDL code
in listing 6.1 describes a combinational circuit that masks the input signals, if the
error signal is active.
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Listing 6.1: Example circuit for masking of the control signals
entity signal_masker is
generic (
-- This generic determines how the signal is deactivated
-- in case 'signal_must_be_masked ' signal is active.
-- If false, the input control nets are active-low.
SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH : boolean
);
port (
-- Input --
error : bit;
reset_circuit_is_active : boolean;
signal_input : bit_vector;
-- Output --
signal_masked : out bit_vector
);
end entity;
architecture arch of signal_masker is
signal signal_must_be_masked : boolean;
begin
signal_must_be_masked <=
true when reset_circuit_is_active or error = '1'
else false;
signal_masked <=
(signal_input 'range => '0')
when signal_must_be_masked
and SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH else
(signal_input 'range => '1')
when signal_must_be_masked
and not SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH else
signal_input;
end architecture;
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6.4.2 Reset circuit
The reset circuit can also be automatically implemented by obtaining the critical
reset path after placing and routing the target circuit and using the equation 6.1.
The obtained shift register size equals to the reset duration of the target circuit.
ThesynthesizableVHDLcode in listing6.2describesacircuitwhichholds the reset
signal active as long as the error signal is active.
Note that the reset signal rst is not immediately activated if the error signal
is active. By doing so, a combinational loop would be created that can spuriously
reset the circuit during the time window when the combinational signals seƦle
before they get registered by the flipflops.
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Listing 6.2: Example circuit for asynchronously reseƦing the target circuit
entity reset_circuit is
generic (
RESET_DURATION: positive := 3;
RESET_SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH : boolean
);
port (
-- Input --
clk, rst : bit;
error : bit;
target_circuit_rst_input : bit;
-- Output --
target_circuit_rst_wrapped : out bit;
reset_circuit_is_active : out boolean
);
end entity;
architecture arch of reset_circuit is
signal counter: natural range 0 to RESET_DURATION;
-- This circuit should be hardened by LTMR
begin
counter_behavior: process (clk, rst)
begin
if rst then
counter <= 0;
elsif rising_edge(clk) then
if counter = RESET_DURATION then
counter <= 0;
elsif error = '1' or counter > 0 then
counter <= counter +1;
end if;
end if;
end process;
reset_circuit_is_active <=
true when counter > 0
else false;
target_circuit_rst_wrapped <=
'1' when reset_circuit_is_active
and RESET_SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH else
'0' when reset_circuit_is_active
and not RESET_SIGNAL_IS_ACTIVE_HIGH else
target_circuit_rst_input;
end architecture;
Chapter 7
Conclusion
High energy particles can cause bitflips on terrestrial and aerospace electronics.
LTMR is often used as the straightforward approach to harden the flipflops of a
sequential digital circuit for mission-critical applications, but LTMR incurs signifi-
cant area and power overhead.
Nowadays, many applications are implemented on complex systems, which
consist ofmany components. In such a system, it is advisable to implement a fault
tolerance approach which exploits already available redundancy onmore flexible
components and reduces the fault tolerance overhead in scarce and costly com-
ponents. With this motivation, we proposed an error detection–based approach
with recomputation. Tomake a comparisonwith LTMRpossible, we chose parity-
based error detection (PBED) as the error detection approach.
We started evaluating our approach by showing the limits of the PBED ap-
proach on the ProASIC3 architecture analytically. The analytical comparison re-
vealed that 60%of the area overhead thatwould be causedby LTMRcanbe saved
by PBED for cluster size of 3. Additionally, we discussed the two critical path can-
didates for PBED, which are the parity generation path and error signal genera-
tion path.
In experiments, we found out that the particular application can significantly
affect the overhead of PBED and LTMR. The overhead of both approaches was
significantly dependent on the enable flipflops present in the original user circuit,
because these flipflops have to be converted to a D-flipflop with a multiplexer. In
larger circuits, we observed an increasing critical path and aƦenuated this effect
by pipelining the error signal reduction. This is not a traditional pipelining and
is based on sequential distance of flipflops to the output of the circuit to avoid
adding additional pipelining register on the primary output of the circuit. In I99T
circuits, pipelined-PBED can achieve up to 1 ns critical path saving compared to
the direct-PBED approach with small area overhead. We observed that most of
theflipflops in thecircuitsweanalyzedhaveasequentialdistanceof 1, sopipelined-
PBED cannot save significant critical path.
In a fault-tolerant system, error detectionmust be usedwith system recovery.
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As system recovery on the target circuit, we used a circuit isolation approach by
immediate masking of the primary outputs, and if available, only the control sig-
nals. During the isolated time, the circuit can be reinitialized using an approach,
which can takemultiple clock cycles.
We presume that a communication protocol will exist in a processing architec-
ture with a user and provider system. System recovery on the user side is done
by transaction-based processing. We specified this approach and discussed the
points that will make the protocol between the user and provider fault-tolerant,
and finally carried out a fault tolerance analysis based on our fault model.
All inall,wesee thatourend-to-endapproachcanachieve timing resultsbeƦer
thanLTMR inexperiments. Ourapproachcan saveup to54%of theareaoverhead
that would be caused by LTMR and can achieve beƦer timing than LTMR in most
circuits.
Generally, in smaller circuits the area overhead factor can rise above 3, and
LTMRis recommendedfor suchcircuits. Butalsoamid-sizedcircuit,whereflipflops
with high fanouts exist, can also cause more area overhead than LTMR, as these
flipflops must be replicated in PBED. LTMR already triplicates every flipflop and
no additional replication is needed for high-fanout flipflops. This underlines the
application dependence of our approach’s cost. Still, the less area overhead com-
pared to LTMRmay be the key to adopt sufficient functionality in a single chip.
We proposed error detection–based fault tolerance as an alternative to LTMR.
As LTMR is an intrinsic error detecting and correcting technique, a comparison
to an error detection–based technique is not straightforward. To achieve an ac-
curate comparison, we have shown an error detection–based fault tolerance con-
cept including recovery and transaction-based processing and implemented it on
a known FPGA for space applications, which allowed us to achieve an accurate
comparison of the timing and area resources. Moreover, we introduced pipelin-
ing for the error signal generation, which enables beƦer timing.
This work provides a basis for future fault-tolerant data processing architec-
tures that consist of massively parallel processing cores like a modern graphics
processing unit. On such an architecture, it can be sufficient to implement an er-
ror detection–based technique on the processing cores. For processing, a job is
divided into sub-jobs which can be processed in parallel. If a core fails to process
a sub-job, then the processing request is repeated. Additionally, if a core is found
out to have a permanent error, then it can bemarked unusable.
We laid the foundations to enable area-efficient data processing for depend-
able spaceborne computing. Through our work, future on-board computers may
provide higher computing performance.
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In radiation environment (e.g., space, nuclear reactor), electronics can fail due to bitflips in 
the flipflops of integrated circuits. A common solution is to triplicate the flipflops and connect 
their outputs to a voter. If one of the three bits is flipped, then the voter outputs the majority 
value and tolerates the error. This method is called triple modular redundancy, (TMR). 
TMR can cause about 300% area redundancy. An alternative way is error detection with 
on-demand recomputation, where the recomputation is done by repeating the failed processing 
request to the processing circuit. The computation is done in consecutive transactions, which 
we call transaction-based processing.
We implemented and evaluated the aforementioned alternative approach using parity 
checking on the Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA, which is often used in space applications. The  
results show that parity-based error detection with our system recovery approach can save 
up to 54% of the area overhead that would be caused by the TMR, and achieve in most  
circuits slightly better timing results than TMR on ProASIC3. This area saving can be the key 
for fitting the application to a space-constrained chip. 
